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Why the National Popular Vote Compact Is
Unconstitutional
Norman R. Williams

*

Unable to secure passage of a federal constitutional amendment
abolishing the Electoral College, several opponents of the Electoral
College have sought to establish the direct, popular election of the
President via an interstate compact according to which individual
signatory states agree to appoint their presidential electors in
accordance with the nationwide popular vote. Ostensibly designed to
prevent elections, such as the one in 2000, in which the Electoral College
“misfired” and chose the candidate who received fewer popular votes,
the National Popular Vote Compact has been adopted by several states,
including California. In this Article, I argue that the National Popular
Vote Compact violates the Presidential Elections Clause of Article II of
the U.S. Constitution. Although the text of the Clause seems to give states
unlimited power to select the manner in which each state’s presidential
electors are chosen, a close reading of U.S. history suggests the need
and propriety of limiting the scope of state authority under the Clause.
Not only did the framers of the Constitution expressly reject the idea of a
direct, popular election for President, but also not one state either in the
wake of ratification or at any time thereafter has ever sought to appoint
its presidential electors on the basis of votes cast outside the state, as the
National Popular Vote Compact requires. In the same way that similar
historical considerations led the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the scope of
state authority with respect to federal legislative elections, this history
regarding the Presidential Elections Clause likewise counsels in favor of
a more limited understanding of state authority under Article II. As such,
if opponents wish to abolish the Electoral College, the sole
constitutionally proper mechanism for doing so is a federal
constitutional amendment, not an interstate compact negotiated by a
handful of states.

 Ken & Claudia Peterson Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Constitutional
Government, Willamette University. AB, Harvard University; JD, New York University. I thank the
participants at the faculty workshops at the University of Illinois and Arizona State University for
their helpful comments and suggestions regarding prior versions of this Article.
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The 2000 presidential election was an eye opener for many
Americans. To the consternation of many, the candidate who won the
most popular votes nationwide actually lost the contest.1 In the election’s
wake, popular attention centered upon the Electoral College and its role
in the presidential election. Under the U.S. Constitution, the people do
not directly vote for the President in a nationwide election; rather, the
people in each state vote for electors from that state, who in turn cast the
constitutionally decisive votes for President and Vice President.
Moreover, not only is the people’s influence indirect, the Electoral
College’s voting pattern does not necessarily track the national popular
vote. The allocation of electors to each state based on their representation
in Congress, coupled with the use of winner-take-all voting in forty-eight
of the fifty states, has produced an electoral system in which the electoral
vote for the winning candidate may differ significantly from the
nationwide popular vote.2 In rare instances, such as in 2000, this process
may produce a President who received fewer popular votes nationwide
than the losing candidate. The New York Times presumably spoke for
many when, in the wake of the 2000 election, it labeled the Electoral
College an “antidemocratic relic.”3
To be sure, the Electoral College has long been the target of
criticism. Of the 11,000 constitutional amendments proposed in Congress
in its history, over 1,000 have dealt with the Electoral College, and many
of those have sought to implement a direct popular election of the
President. In fact, bills proposing a constitutional amendment to abolish
the Electoral College are routinely introduced in every Congress.
Nevertheless, these proposals have all failed to pass Congress. In fact,
over forty years have passed since Congress seriously considered a
constitutional amendment abolishing the College.4 Popular support for

1. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000 (2000).
2. In 1980, for example, Ronald Reagan received only 50.8% of the national popular vote
but won 44 states, comprising 489 (91%) of the 538 electoral votes. David Leip, 1980 Presidential
General Election Results, ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://usele
ctionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1980&off=0&f=1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
3. Editorial, Drop Out of the College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26.
4. L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30804, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 15 (2001); William
Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 150 (1996). In
1969, the House of Representatives passed an amendment abolishing the College, but it failed to
secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate. Sanford Levinson, Is Moderation Sufficient
When Addressing the Ills of the Electoral College?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 220, 222 (2007). In 1979, a
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constitutional reform, it seems, is widespread but too shallow to
overcome the high hurdle of Article V.
Dissatisfied with the failure of Congress to pass a constitutional
amendment abolishing the Electoral College, several reform-minded
citizens, including law professors Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, and Robert
Bennett, came up with a novel way to transform the manner in which the
nation elects its President that avoided the time-consuming and daunting
process required for a constitutional amendment.5 Their idea, known as
the “National Popular Vote Interstate Compact” or “NPVC,” was to have
a large group of states agree to appoint their presidential electors in
accordance with the national popular vote rather than their respective
statewide popular vote.6 Once states comprising a majority of the
Electoral College signed on, the NPVC would go into effect and,
according to its proponents, the national popular vote would conclusively
decide the winner of the election regardless of whether all the states
agreed or a constitutional amendment abolishing the college was
adopted. In essence, these reformers sought to use the coordinated action
of a number of states to turn the Electoral College into the vehicle of its
own reform.
To date, eight states and the District of Columbia have formally
joined the compact, and several other states have moved toward joining
it.7 Moreover, public opinion polls show widespread, bipartisan popular
support for moving to the direct popular election of the President, as the

similar amendment was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 51–48. 125 CONG. REC. 17,766 (1979).
5. See Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the President Without
a Constitutional Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 141, 148 (2002); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution:
Part Three of a Three-Part Series on the 2000 Election and the Electoral College, FINDLAW (Dec.
28, 2001), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/2001122 8.html.
6. Robert Bennett, as well as the Amar brothers, originally proposed that each state
implement this reform through coordinated, contingent legislation in each state. Robert W. Bennett,
Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 241, 244–
45 (2001); Amar & Amar, supra note 5. Later, John Koza championed the idea that the agreement be
formally memorialized in an interstate compact. JOHN KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATEBASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 247 (2d ed. 2008).
7. See National Popular Vote Interstate Agreement Act of 2010, 57 D.C. Reg. 9869;
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2008 Haw. Sess.
Laws 205; Act effective Jan. 1, 2009, 2008 Ill. Laws 1; Presidential Elections—Agreement Among
the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2007 Md. Laws 855; Agreement Among
the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2010 Mass. Acts ch. 229; Agreement
Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2007 N.J. Laws 2094;
Presidential Election—Popular Vote—States’ Agreement—Washington, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws
1390.
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NPVC seeks to do. Indeed, by one recent poll, seventy-two percent of
Americans favor dispensing with the Electoral College and moving to a
direct popular election.8 Calls to reform the Electoral College have an
obvious and intuitive appeal to Americans, who have an abiding faith in
the virtue and essential justice of majoritarian democracy.
As I have written elsewhere,9 claims that the Electoral College
thwarts the majority will are grossly overstated; the Electoral College
typically tracks rather than thwarts popular sentiment. As such, I am
skeptical of the need for reform, but, even assuming, arguendo, that the
Electoral College system should be replaced, the NPVC is the wrong
way to go about such reform. Much has been written about the NPVC,
including its constitutionality.10 Somewhat surprisingly, however,
constitutional commentators have focused exclusively on the questions
whether the NPVC violates the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10,
or the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.11 No one has undertaken a
sustained analysis of the more fundamental (and, in my view,
analytically prior) question whether Article II, Section 1 permits states,
acting alone or in concert with others, to appoint presidential electors in
accordance with the national popular vote. To the extent that
commentators acknowledge the issue, the conventional view is that states
have absolute discretion to appoint their delegates in any manner they
see fit. Indeed, for some commentators, the point is not even arguable.12

8. WASH. POST–KAISER FAMILY FOUND.–HARVARD UNIV. SURVEY PROJECT, SURVEY OF
POLITICAL INDEPENDENTS 12–13 (2007), available at http://www.nationalpopularvote
.com/resources/Wash-Post-Kaiser-Harvard-June-2007.pdf.
9. Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism,
and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173 (2011).
10. See, e.g., David Gringer, Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to
Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2008); Brandon H. Robb, Making the
Electoral College Work Today: The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National
Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. REV. 419 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 1499 (2009). In addition, the Election Law Journal held a symposium devoted entirely to the
NPVC. See Jamin B. Raskin, Neither the Red States nor the Blue States but the United States: The
National Popular Vote and American Political Democracy, 7 ELECTION L.J. 188 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The National Popular Vote
Legislation, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205 (2007); Kristin Feeley, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected
President, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1427 (2009); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the
President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218, 220 (2008); Derek T.
Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J.
372 (2007); Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON. L. REV. 717
(2007); Tushnet, supra note 10, at 1500 n.5.
12. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 10, at 193 (arguing that no one seriously contests the
constitutionality of the NPVC “because it is so clearly within the plenary power of the states to
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Disagreeing with this conventional wisdom, this Article concludes that
the states lack the power to appoint their presidential electors on the basis
of votes of citizens outside the state’s jurisdiction and, therefore, states
are without authority to adopt the NPVC.
Although Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution entrusts to the
state legislatures the power to determine the manner in which
presidential electors are selected, that power is not plenary in the
customary sense. Rather, that power is limited, and the extent of that
limitation is borne out by the historical understanding of the scope of
state authority under Article II. At the time of the Framing of the U.S.
Constitution, the framers envisioned a system in which states would
select electors in accordance with the sentiments of state citizens, not the
nation generally. Moreover, in the years following the Framing, every
single state, both original and newly admitted, established a system of
selecting presidential electors based either directly or indirectly on the
sentiments of state voters. At no point in our nation’s history has any
state sought to appoint its electors on the basis of voter sentiment outside
the state, let alone the national popular vote. The Constitution’s
delegation of power to the state legislature must therefore be read in light
of this uniform, uncontested understanding that states are required to
select electors in accordance with popular sentiment of voters in the state
or the districts within it.
While this conclusion may strike many as counterintuitive, a detailed
examination of American constitutional history as it relates to
presidential elections demonstrates its veracity. Part I briefly describes
the presidential election process, the criticism of it, and how the NPVC
seeks to transform the process. Part II then explores the debates at the
Constitutional Convention in 1787, revealing that the framers expressly
rejected the direct popular election of the President and instead settled on
the Electoral College as a way to preserve the influence of the states,
particularly smaller states, in the selection of the President. Significantly,
this Part establishes that the framers expected state legislatures to select
electors in accordance with state sentiment, not a national popular vote.
Confirming this expectation, Part III then canvasses the manner in which
the states exercised their constitutional authority to select presidential
electors in the first few elections following the ratification of the

appoint their electors in any manner they see fit”); Mark Rush, Legal Portrait of the United States
Presidential Election of 2008, 3 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 81, 92 (2009) (characterizing the
constitutional question as a “minor issue”).
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Constitution. In fact, as this Part shows, although the states have
experimented over time with different systems for selecting their
electors, every single system ever employed has selected the electors
based on the expression of support among state voters, not the voters of
the nation at large.
Building upon this history, Part IV then explores the ramifications
for the constitutionality of the NPVC. As this history suggests, the
requirement that states appoint electors committed to the candidate who
won the national popular vote exceeds the power delegated to the states
under Article II, Section 1. Moreover, even if the historical evidence
were not so clear, considerations of constitutional structure likewise
counsel against reading Article II in the broad manner that proponents of
the NPVC do. If a majority of states have the power to select electors on
any basis, there is nothing to stop a majority of states from agreeing to
appoint electors committed to candidates only from those states or, more
ominously, from one political party. The same reasons that would
condemn the validity of such regionalist or partisan compacts likewise
condemn the NPVC.
In short, whether or not one believes that the current system of
electing the President should be changed, the NPVC is the wrong way to
go about such reform. Indeed, it is a manifestly unconstitutional way to
undertake it.
I. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT13
A. The Current Process
As the U.S. Supreme Court pointedly reminded the American people
in Bush v. Gore,14 the President is not elected by the people but rather by
electors appointed by the states—the so-called “Electoral College.” The
framers adopted this system of indirect election to provide the President
with a degree of independence from Congress. Were the President
selected by Congress—the principal alternative to the Electoral College
considered by the framers—the framers feared that he would be too
dependent on Congress and that potential candidates for the office would
seek congressional support by making undesirable, if not downright

13. Several sections of this Part’s summary of the presidential-election process, most notably
its description of the current process and how the National Popular Vote Compact seeks to change it,
are borrowed from an earlier article of mine. See Williams, supra note 9.
14. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
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corrupt, promises in return for such support.15 Moreover, further
reflecting the “Great Compromise” in which legislative power was split
between the popularly apportioned House of Representatives and
federally apportioned Senate, the framers specified in the Constitution
that each state receives electors equal in number to the representatives
and senators that state possesses in Congress.16
The Constitution leaves it to each state to determine how its electors
are selected, specifying that the electors shall be appointed by each state
“in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”17 Although
many state legislatures originally appointed the electors directly, by the
mid-1830s, all but one state (South Carolina) had moved to a system of
holding popular elections to select the electors.18 Relatedly, while states
at first used different electoral systems—some states used an at-large
system that effectively gave all the state’s electors to the winning
candidate, others used a district system, while still others used a
combination of both the at-large and district systems—all of the states
ultimately adopted the at-large system.19
In actuality, the at-large system was not a true “winner-take-all”
system because citizens still voted for individual electors, which could
result in some voters, intentionally or not, selecting electors who
supported different candidates.20 In the twentieth century, states moved
to a true winner-take-all system with the adoption of the so-called “short
ballot,” which removed the electors’ names from the ballot and listed
only the presidential and vice presidential tickets. With the short ballot,
regardless of the number of electors possessed by the state, citizens
would cast only one vote for the presidential and vice-presidential ticket
of their choice; the state would then award the winning ticket all of that
state’s electors.21 Today, all states use the short ballot,22 and all but two

15. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 69 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter Farrand, RECORDS].
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. By virtue of the Twenty-third Amendment, the District of
Columbia participates in the presidential election and receives three electors. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIII.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
18. WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 2. South Carolina’s legislature continued to
appoint the state’s electors until after the Civil War. Id.
19. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1892).
20. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 161. For example, in 1912, California voters elected
eleven Progressive and two Democratic electors, and, in 1916, West Virginia voters elected seven
Republican and one Democratic elector. Id.
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-6-23 (2007) (“When electors for the President and Vice-
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states use this winner-take-all system. The two exceptions, Maine and
Nebraska, award their two “senatorial” electors to the winner of the
statewide election, but, in each state, the voters in each congressional
district select an elector for that district. As a result, the presidential
candidates can split the electors from those states, as took place in
Nebraska in 2008.23
As most Americans understand, the general election takes place in
early November. That date, however, is not specified in the Constitution
but rather has been set by Congress by statute. Congress has set the
Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the date on which the
general election must take place.24 The presidential electors, in turn, cast
their vote on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in
December.25 By virtue of the Twelfth Amendment, each elector casts
two votes, one for President and one for Vice President.26
Although by tradition American political scientists and constitutional
commentators refer to it as a “college,” the Electoral College never meets
as one body. Unlike Congress or other representative institutions, the
Electoral College was not conceived as a deliberative body in which the
electors would discuss and debate the relative merits of the candidates.
Rather, the framers feared that, were all the electors to assemble in one
place, they would engage in vote-swapping and collusion.27 To prevent
that eventuality, the framers specified in the Constitution that the electors

President of the United States are to be elected, the names of the candidates for President and VicePresident shall be listed on the ballot, but not the names of the electors.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2644(B) (2011) (“The qualified voter at a presidential election shall mark the square preceding the
names and party designation for his choice of candidates for President and Vice President. His ballot
so marked shall be counted as if he had marked squares preceding the names of the individual
electors affiliated with his choice for President and Vice President.”).
22. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 56.
23. Barack Obama lost the state of Nebraska (and two of its three congressional districts) but
won a majority of support in one of the state’s congressional districts, thereby giving him one of
Nebraska’s five electoral votes.
24. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
25. Id. § 7.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. As originally enacted, the Constitution specified that the
electors would cast two votes, but the electors could not designate which person they favored as
President versus Vice President. As a result, in the 1800 election, Democratic-Republican electors
cast the same number of votes for Thomas Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr, which
deprived the former of an Electoral College majority and sent the election to the House of
Representatives (which only selected Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot). That election ultimately
prompted the passage of the Twelfth Amendment.
27. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 500; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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for each state should meet in their respective states.28 The framers further
envisioned that the electors would be sage, independent men capable of
evaluating the relative merits of the candidates and that, when separated
into their various states, they would determine who among the
presidential aspirants was best qualified in intellect and temperament to
lead the nation.29
Not surprisingly, the post-Framing-era rise of party politics has
produced a presidential election system much unlike that envisioned by
the framers. Far from being elite political sages, the presidential electors
are almost invariably dedicated partisans, usually prominent officials in
the state party apparatus who can be trusted to vote for the presidential
candidate of their party. As a result, while there have been a handful of
instances in which a “faithless elector” voted for some other candidate,30
party loyalty typically ensures that the electors ultimately cast their vote
for the candidate to which they are pledged.31 Since 1796, there have
been only ten faithless electors out of the over 20,000 electors, and none
of those faithless electors affected the outcome of the election.32 Hence,
as a practical matter, the popular vote in each state conclusively
determines which candidate receives that state’s electoral votes. It is for
that reason that Americans typically know who has won the presidential
election the night of the general election; no one waits with bated breath
for the Electoral College ballots to be counted, even though it is that act,
not the popular vote, that has constitutional significance.
While the Electoral College’s vote may be a formality, it is a
formality that is and must be performed. After the electors cast their
ballots in mid-December, the ballots are transmitted to Congress, which
opens and counts the votes in early January.33 To be elected President
and Vice President, the winning candidates must receive a majority of
the electoral votes of all the states. In the event that no candidate receives

28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; see also 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (specifying that electors shall
meet at a location in the state designated by the legislature thereof).
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
30. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 147 & n.18; WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at
10.
31. Some states legally bind the electors to support the candidate to which they are pledged.
WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 9. The constitutionality of such provisions is hotly contested.
Id. at 10 & n.47; cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (upholding requirement that elector pledge to
support party’s candidate but distinguishing laws that bound electors to so vote).
32. Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7
ELECTION L.J. 196, 211 (2008).
33. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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a majority, the election for President is thrown to the House of
Representatives to determine the President from among the top three vote
recipients in the Electoral College’s balloting.34 In the House’s voting,
each state receives one vote with a majority of states necessary to elect
the President. On only two occasions (1800 and 1824) has the election
gone to the House under this contingent election procedure.35
Today, there are 538 electors from the fifty states and the District of
Columbia. As a result, a presidential candidate must receive 270 electors
to be elected President. California has the most electors (fifty-five), while
Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, and Vermont have the fewest (three). As a theoretical
matter, a candidate could win the presidency by winning the top eleven
most populous states, which collectively possess the bare minimum 270
electoral votes. In actuality, since 1960 (the first election in a fifty-state
union), no candidate has won the White House with less than twenty-two
states, which John F. Kennedy did in 1960.36
B. The Criticism of the Electoral College
As the foregoing summary indicates, for well over a century, people
in every state have voted in the presidential election.37 Moreover, with
just a few exceptions, the electors selected by the people have faithfully
voted the electorate’s preferences.38 Hence, while in form the Electoral
College serves as a political intermediary between the people and the
President, in practice, the votes of the people are transmitted almost
automatically into electoral votes. In short, the popular provenance of the
electors, coupled with the faithful transmittal of electoral preferences by
34. If no vice-presidential candidate receives a majority, the Senate elects the Vice President
from among the top two vote recipients. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. There has been one election in
which the election of the Vice President was thrown to the Senate. In 1836, Martin Van Buren’s
running mate, Richard Johnson, failed to receive the necessary majority (because Virginia’s electors
balked at his qualifications), but the Senate ultimately elected him anyway.
35. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCe, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 30–31
(1996).
36. Id. at 46–48. Two additional states, Alabama and Mississippi, went Democratic in the
voting, but more voters in those states, protesting the national party’s civil-rights platform, favored
unpledged Democratic electors rather than electors pledged to the Democratic nominee John F.
Kennedy. The unpledged electors ultimately voted for Sen. Harry Byrd. Id. at 57.
37. The last state to have its legislature appoint its electors was Colorado in 1876, which took
place only because Colorado had been so recently admitted to the union as a state that its legislature
did not have time to provide for a popular election for its presidential electors. McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33 (1892).
38. See Smith, supra note 32, at 211.
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the electors themselves, has fatally undermined any suggestion that the
Electoral College is antidemocratic.39 The President is truly elected by
the people.
The principal charge against the Electoral College is that it is
antimajoritarian.40 Specifically, the controversy surrounding the
Electoral College has centered upon the allocation of political power
among the people in the states resulting from the fact that electors are
allocated on a state-by-state basis, with each state receiving the number
of electors corresponding to its number of representatives and senators.
This allocation of electors departs from the majoritarian ideal in two
ways. First, because of indivisible population variances among the states,
the number of representatives allocated to each state does not map
perfectly with the population of the states. Both Missouri and Minnesota,
for example, have eight representatives (and therefore ten electors), but
Missouri has at least 684,000 more inhabitants than Minnesota.41
Second, because each state receives two senatorial electors regardless of
its population, less populous states receive more electors than a strict,
population-based allocation would produce. Wyoming, for example, has
three electors for its 563,000 residents (or one for every 187,600
residents in the state), while California has fifty-five electors for its
thirty-seven million-plus residents (or one for every 677,000 residents).42
If electors were apportioned strictly on the basis of population, Wyoming
would have only one elector, while California would have sixty-five.
The critics seize on this apportionment of electors and point to the
fact that, as a consequence, the Electoral College can elect a President

39. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 165 (1986).
Some commentators continue to decry the College as “antidemocratic.” See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty,
Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (2001). That is a misnomer, however. The
substance of the commentators’ criticism—that the Electoral College does not guarantee the election
of the candidate with the most votes—suggests that their concern is more properly viewed as one of
antimajoritarianism than antidemocracy. Cf. Brannon P. Denning, Publius for All of Us, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 75, 85 (2009) (distinguishing between charges that the Electoral College is antidemocratic versus anti-majoritarian and declaring that latter is “more precise”); Sanford Levinson,
How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L.
REV. 859, 868, 876–77 (2007) (arguing that the Electoral College does not respect majority vote and
noting that the antidemocratic charge is synonymous with an antimajoritarian charge).
40. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–17; James A. Gardner, Forcing States to Be Free: The
Emerging Constitutional Guarantee of Radical Democracy, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1467, 1494 (2003);
Levinson, supra note 39, at 868–69.
41. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS (2011), available at http://2010.census
.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php.
42. See id.
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who lost the nationwide popular vote. As evidence, the critics allege the
Electoral College has “misfired” at least three times in our history.43 In
1876, Republican Rutherford Hayes won a bare majority of Electoral
College votes, even though Democrat Samuel Tilden received 250,000
more popular votes. In 1888, Republican Benjamin Harrison received a
substantial majority of electoral votes, despite the fact that Democrat
Grover Cleveland received 91,000 more popular votes. Most recently, in
2000, Republican George W. Bush won a bare majority of electoral
votes, while Democrat Albert Gore received over half a million more
popular votes nationwide.44 In the critics’ view, the Electoral College is
therefore a threat to American democracy; even though the people vote,
the Electoral College so distorts the manner in which their votes are
aggregated that the loser may actually win. For this reason, the critics
urge that, like legislative appointment of U.S. senators, the Electoral
College should be discarded in favor of the direct popular election of the
President.45
To be sure, throughout American history, there have been many
efforts to reform or eliminate the Electoral College, but all have failed.
Of the 11,000 constitutional amendments proposed in Congress, over
1,000 have dealt with the Electoral College, and many of those have
sought to implement a direct popular election.46 In the most recent

43. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–18; NEIL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE
PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE
ALTERNATIVE 116 (1981).
44. Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-For-Hostages,
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 503, 538 (2003) (“Gore lost not because we have an electoral college, but because we have an
electoral college that is so profoundly malapportioned.”). The election of 1824 is also sometimes
listed as an example of an election of a minority President, but the circumstances of that election
cloud the picture. E.g., KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16. Four strong candidates (John Quincy
Adams, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and William Crawford) split the Electoral College vote,
sending the election for the second and last time to the House of Representatives. The House
ultimately selected Adams, even though Jackson had won more votes. Three points distinguish this
election from the others. First, it was the House, not the Electoral College, that selected the President
(and it is therefore the House who deserves the blame, if any). Second, the four candidates had split
the popular vote too, such that Jackson received only forty-one percent of the popular vote. Third,
and most importantly, six states, including the populous state of New York, which heavily favored
Adams over the three Southern candidates, did not conduct a popular election and instead used
legislative appointment for their presidential electors. It is simply impossible to know whether
Adams lost the nationwide popular vote because there was none.
45. Levinson, supra note 39, at 868.
46. Thomas E. Cronin, Foreword to JUDITH BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? DEBATING
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE viii (1996); Chang, supra note 11, at 210.
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Congress, there was one bill proposing a constitutional amendment to
eliminate the Electoral College and move to a direct popular election, but
it went nowhere.47 Article V, though, imposes a high threshold for
amendments: a proposed amendment must pass both houses of Congress
by a two-thirds vote and then be ratified by three-quarters of the states.48
In 1969, the House passed such an amendment, but it failed to secure the
necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate.49 In 1979, the Senate
rejected a similar amendment by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight.50
Since then, other proposed amendments abolishing the Electoral College
have died without floor action.51 Popular support for constitutional
reform, it seems, is widespread but shallow.
C. The National Popular Vote Compact
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election, several critics of the
Electoral College came up with a clever way to circumvent the Electoral
College without, in their view, at least, the need for a constitutional
amendment. Recognizing that the Constitution assigns to the state
legislatures the power to direct the manner in which each state’s electors
are selected, these critics imagined that each state could decide on its
own to award all of its electors to the candidate who won the nationwide
popular vote. Of course, were only one or two individual states to do so,
there would be no guarantee that their adoption of such an appointment
system would ensure that the candidate who won the popular vote would
win the Electoral College vote.52 At the same time, there could be
substantial domestic political costs for states that unilaterally adopted
such a system. Without the guarantee that the popular vote winner would
actually prevail nationwide, few states would relish appointing electors
pledged to the candidate who lost that state’s poll.

47. H.R.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2011). The resolution was referred to the House Judiciary
Committee, which in turn referred it to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, where no further
action on it was taken.
48. U.S. CONST. art. V. Amendments may also be proposed by a national convention, but that
mechanism has never been used.
49. Levinson, supra note 4, at 222.
50. 125 CONG. REC. 17766 (1979).
51. WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 15; Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 150.
52. One of the critics, law professor Robert Bennett, disagrees. Bennett argues that even if
one or two large states decided to unilaterally adopt such an appointment process, the number of
electors controlled by those states would make it nearly impossible for a candidate who lost the
popular vote to amass an Electoral College majority out of the remaining states. Bennett, supra note
6, at 244.
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Appreciating this collective-action problem, the proponents
developed the idea of an interstate compact among the states. Under the
terms of this proposed National Popular Vote Compact, each state agrees
to hold a statewide popular election for President, as every state already
does.53 After the election, each signatory state’s chief election official
determines the number of votes cast for each presidential–vice
presidential slate of candidates in her state and communicates those
numbers to all other states’ chief election officials.54 Once all of the
statewide popular election vote totals are ascertained and the national
popular vote winner determined, the compact requires that each signatory
state appoint the slate of electors committed to the candidate who won
the national popular vote, regardless whether that candidate won that
particular state’s own poll.55
For a measure that seeks to profoundly alter the manner in which the
nation’s chief executive is selected, the NPVC is otherwise surprisingly
brief and cursory. To address the collective-action problem, the compact
provides that it will not go into effect until states comprising a majority
of the Electoral College sign on.56 In that way, there is no obligation for
a state to appoint electors contrary to its own voters’ will until such time
it can be sure that, in so doing, the national popular vote winner will
secure the presidency thereby. To prevent states from triggering the
implementation of the NPVC late in the presidential campaign, the
NPVC governs only presidential elections in which the requisite college
of states has ratified the NPVC by July 20 of the election year.
Correspondingly, to prevent strategic defections by individual states late
in the election cycle, the compact also specifies that a signatory state
may withdraw from the compact only if it does so before July 20 in a
presidential election year.57 As to other important aspects of the election
process, such as the conduct of the election in the states, the counting of

53. AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONWIDE VOTE, art.
II [hereinafer AGREEMENT], available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ pages/misc/888word
compact.php.
54. Id. art. III. Moreover, to instill public confidence in the counting of ballots, the official
must make public those vote totals “as they are determined or obtained.” Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. art. IV.
57. Id. If a state attempts to withdraw after that date, the compact purports to bind the state
through the upcoming presidential election. The legal and practical problems with enforcing that
requirement are discussed in Williams, supra note 9, at 216–22.
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ballots, or the triggering and manner of conducting recounts, the
proposed compact is silent.58
Proponents of the NPVC believe that it will fundamentally transform
American presidential elections. In their view, once the compact goes
into effect, the presidential election would become solely the product of
the nationwide popular vote; whether a candidate won a particular state,
such as Florida in 2000, would be irrelevant. Indeed, supporters hope that
even those states that refused to sign on to the compact would find
themselves powerless to produce a victory for any other candidate.59 By
virtue of their Electoral College majority, the signatory states’ pledge to
appoint their electors to the national popular vote winner would be
conclusive. The NPVC supporters also hope that its passage will change
the nature of presidential campaigns. In their view, a few select swing
states (such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida) currently receive too
much attention from the presidential candidates, while “safe” states (such
as California and New York for the Democrats and Texas and the South
for the Republicans) receive too little.60 By eliminating the importance
of winning individual states, proponents of the NPVC believe that
candidates will spend more time in other states, attempting to increase
their national vote margins.
As of February 2012, eight states, including the electoral behemoth
California, with its fifty-five electoral votes, and the District of Columbia
have adopted the NPVC.61 Those states collectively possess 132
electoral votes, almost half of the electoral votes necessary for the NPVC
to go into effect. Moreover, supporters are confident that political
momentum is building in their favor. The NPVC has been passed in one
or both houses of the legislature in a number of states.62 Together, those
states comprise an additional 111 electoral votes. If those states ratified
the NPVC, it would be only thirty-two electoral votes short of
ratification. Based on these expressions of popular support, proponents
of the NPVC hope that the NPVC will gather the requisite number of
states to be in effect for the 2016 presidential election.63

58. AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. IV.
59. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 247.
60. See, e.g., id. at xxix; Chang, supra note 11, at 218–19.
61. Those states are California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii,
Vermont, and Washington.
62. The Connecticut House, for example, approved the NPVC on May 11, 2009.
63. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 281.
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D. Criticism of the NPVC
As might be expected, the NPVC itself has attracted a great deal of
academic interest. For many critics of the current Electoral Collegebased system, such as Akhil Amar and Robert Bennett, the NPVC offers
a welcomed way to usher in the direct popular election of the
President.64 For others, however, the NPVC is a dangerous run around
the constitutional requirement that any change in the presidential election
process be accomplished by constitutional amendment.
Criticism of the NPVC falls into two, broad camps. First, many
critics contest the desirability of the NPVC from a policy standpoint. In a
prior article, I identified several problems with the NPVC.65 Among
other shortcomings, the NPVC permits the election of a President with a
bare plurality of the popular vote; it fails to provide for a nationwide
recount in the case of a close election; it fails to address the electoral and
constitutional crisis if one or more states obstruct the calculation of a
national popular vote or withdraw from the compact on the eve of—or
worse, shortly after—the general election; and, finally, by virtue of the
differences among the states with regard to each other’s electoral rules
and procedures, the NPVC simply substitutes one form of
malapportionment for another. While the current system ostensibly
favors citizens in small states, the NPVC would favor citizens in those
states with generous election rules and procedures.
Second, several critics contest the constitutionality of the NPVC. To
date, these critics have founded their arguments on the Compact Clause
of Article I, Section 10, which provides that no state may “enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State” without Congress’s
consent.66 Despite this seemingly categorical language which forbids
states from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact” with another
state absent Congress’s consent, the U.S. Supreme Court has
acknowledged that some interstate agreements do not qualify as
compacts and therefore do not require congressional consent.67 Seizing

64. See Bennett, supra note 5; Amar & Amar, supra note 5.
65. See Williams, supra note 9.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
67. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 469 (1978); Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (“Looking at the clause in which the terms ‘compact’ or
‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States.”).
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upon this line of cases, proponents of the NPVC argue that congressional
consent is not required to make the NPVC valid.68
While I am sympathetic to the critics’ constitutional claims, the
Compact Clause strikes me as of secondary importance. After all,
implicit in the critics’ argument is that Congress could validate the
NPVC by consenting to it. In my view, that concession is unwarranted
for a reason unrelated to the Compact Clause. Rather, in my view,
whether or not the Compact Clause requires Congress’s consent to the
NPVC, the NPVC is unconstitutional because it violates Article II of the
Constitution. Given the seemingly categorical language of Article II,
which provides that the manner of selecting presidential electors is left to
the discretion of each state’s legislature,69 such a claim may at first blush
seem improbable. Nevertheless, there is good reason to read the language
of Article II more narrowly than do the proponents of the NPVC. In
particular, the history of the adoption of Article II and its use by state
legislatures in the past two centuries evince that, while states have the
authority to appoint electors based on the results of a statewide or district
election, they cannot appoint electors based on election results in other
states.
II. THE ADOPTION OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
To be sure, the Electoral College was not the product of some highly
theorized conception of executive power. Nor was it the result of the
framers copying and paying homage to an institutional construct whose
bona fides had been demonstrated by time and experience. Indeed, unlike
the new Congress, which followed upon the Continental and
Confederation Congresses, the new presidency had no precursor in the
colonial- or Confederation-era government, which lacked a national
executive. While the framers could draw some lessons from the
experience of the states, each of which had a chief executive, that lesson
was primarily negative in character, illustrating what the new national
government should avoid, not what it should emulate. The Revolutionera state constitutions, which had been drafted in response to the fears of
replicating the abusive royal governors of colonial times, either provided
for a popularly elected governor with a short term of office, sometimes
no more than one year in length, or more typically vested the selection of
the governor in the legislature, which made the former dependent upon
68. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 439–45.
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.

1539

WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:57 PM

2012

and therefore ultimately subservient to the latter.70 As a result, the
Confederation-era state governors were an enfeebled lot, lacking the
energy and independence that the framers fervently wished the new
federal executive to possess.
In a very real sense, the framers who convened in Philadelphia in the
summer of 1787 were writing upon a blank slate. Ultimately, the
decision to vest the selection of the new President in an Electoral College
was embraced by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787
not because anyone thought it was the best way to elect the President, but
because it was preferable to the two primary alternatives: direct election
by the people or appointment by Congress. As historian Jack Rakove
accurately observed, the establishment of the Electoral College “owed
more to the perceived defects in alternative modes of election than to any
great confidence that this ingenious mechanism would work in
practice.”71 For the framers, the Electoral College was a second-best
solution.
Before condemning the framers for their lack of imagination,
however, it is first necessary to understand the political forces that led
the framers to embrace the Electoral College over the alternatives. And
to do that, it is first critical to situate the debate over the process of
selecting the President within the more fundamental political battle that
divided the Constitutional Convention regarding the status and role of the
states in the new national political union. Only after one appreciates the
contours of that more fundamental battle over the nature of the union and
the closely intertwined issue regarding the representative structure of the
new Congress can one begin to appreciate the forces that led the framers
to settle upon an institution that, to modern eyes at least, is a political
anachronism.

70. Of the twelve states represented at the Constitutional Convention, eight of them had
legislatively appointed governors. DEL. CONST. art. VII (1776); GA. CONST. art. II (1777); N.C.
CONST. art. XV (1776); N.J. CONST. art. VII (1776); PA. CONST. ch. II, art. XIX (1776); S.C. CONST.
art. III (1778). Only Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire had a popularly
elected executive. See CONN. CHARTER (1662) (popularly elected for one-year term); MASS. CONST.
pt. 2, ch. II, art. III (1780) (popularly elected for one-year term); N.H. CONST. pt. II (1784)
(popularly elected for one-year term); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, XVIII (1777) (popularly elected for
three-year term).
71. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 267 (1996). See also PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra
note 43, at 22 (noting that the Electoral College was “the second choice of many delegates”).
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A. The Nature of the Union

As its name suggested, the Articles of Confederation established a
loose confederation among the thirteen states that declared and then won
their independence from Great Britain in the Revolutionary War. Under
the terms of the Articles, each state was a sovereign entity that stood on
equal political footing with the other states in the confederation.72 As
such, each state received one vote in the Confederation Congress,
regardless of its population.73 Not surprisingly, the large, populous
states, such as Virginia and Pennsylvania, resented this system, which
gave Virginia the same political power in the Congress as Rhode Island
or Georgia. Even worse, alterations to the Articles required the
unanimous consent of all the states, thereby empowering a single state to
veto proposed changes endorsed by the other states.
In the years following the Revolution, the Confederation Congress
found itself woefully unable to protect the new nation’s interests abroad
or to respond to emerging challenges at home. The Confederation
Congress’s failings were numerous, but most notable among them was
its inability to raise funds to retire the Revolutionary War debt and to
provide a uniform system of taxation and regulation for interstate and
foreign commerce. Strikingly, the Articles of Confederation did not
authorize Congress to lay taxes directly upon the people but rather left
Congress in the untenable position of requisitioning funds from the state
legislatures.74 When Congress made such requisitions, states often failed
to comply with them.75 In response, Congress asked the states several
times to consent to amendments to the Articles to vest Congress with the
authority to lay its own duties on foreign imports, but the proposals were
vetoed first by Rhode Island and then later by New York.76 At the same
time, and relatedly, the Confederation government found itself powerless
to establish a coherent policy with respect to foreign or interstate
commerce, leaving American commercial interests subject to a disparate
web of regulations and taxes adopted by the states. Without the power to
lay a tax or regulate commerce, Congress found itself both financially

72. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
73. Id. art. V (allotting one vote per state). Interestingly, the Articles of Confederation
described the Confederation as a “league of friendship” among the states. Id. art. III.
74. Id. art. VIII.
75. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 15–16 (2005).
76. Id. at 26–29.
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starved and constitutionally disabled from protecting the new nation’s
emerging commercial interests.
The manifest and apparent weakness of the Confederation Congress
with respect to finances and commerce ultimately led to the
Constitutional Convention that assembled in Philadelphia in May 1787.
Though the Convention had been formally tasked merely with revising
the Articles to establish a more robust national government capable of
promoting American interests, many delegates saw the opportunity to use
the Convention to bring about a more profound, fundamental change in
the nature of the union. No one more clearly saw both the need for and
the opportunity to undertake such a revolution in government than James
Madison, who would play a critical role at the Constitutional Convention
and ensuing ratification debates.77 In Madison’s view, the problem with
the Confederation Congress was not merely that it lacked particular
powers; rather, its dependence upon the states, particularly the state
legislatures, ineluctably rendered it incapable of promoting the nation’s
interests. In Madison’s view, the inherent parochialism of representatives
deputized by and on behalf of the state governments would “never fail to
render federal measures abortive.”78
The Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787, and on May
29, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia introduced the socalled “Virginia Plan.” Primarily the work of Madison, the Virginia Plan
reflected the profound ambitions of its author to remove the states from
the center of the political galaxy that they occupied under the Articles of
Confederation. Under the terms of the Virginia Plan, there would be a
new national government composed of three separate branches. With
respect to the legislative branch, the Confederation Congress would be
replaced with a bicameral Congress apportioned on the basis of state
population.79 With the least populous state entitled to at least one
representative, the Virginia Plan was not entirely majoritarian—
representatives would be assigned on a state-by-state basis which would
inevitably lead to some variances in population among congressional
delegations from different states—but its underlying political theory was
one in which political power tracked population. Moreover, in further
contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan specified that

77. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 472–73
(1998).
78. 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 352 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
79. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 20–21.
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members of the lower house of the new Congress would be elected
directly by the people.80 The members of the upper house, in turn, were
to be selected by the lower house from a list of candidates nominated by
the states.81 Unlike the Confederation Congress, the state legislatures
would not control the selection of the members of either house of
Congress.
The Virginia Plan was a direct assault upon the notion that each state
was a political equal of the others, and it was understood as such not only
by its supporters but, equally importantly, by its opponents in the smaller
states, such as Delaware. Delegates from the smaller states viewed the
Virginia Plan—correctly—as a threat to their political influence in the
new Congress. In response, on June 15, they put forth the so-called “New
Jersey Plan.” Their plan followed the Virginia Plan in creating a tripartite
national government, but it preserved the pre-existing political structure
of the Confederation-era Congress. Although Congress’s powers would
be enlarged, it would remain a one-house assembly in which each state
received an equal vote and whose members would be selected by the
state legislatures.82
Proponents of each plan viewed the other scheme not only as a threat
to their own state’s interests but as fundamentally inconsistent with the
political foundation of the new union. For proponents of the Virginia
Plan, the new Constitution would create a new national government that
derived its power not from the states but from the people directly. As
such, the new Congress would be elected by the people to represent the
people. As a corollary to this conception of the new union, the number of
representatives necessarily had to be based on population so as to ensure
equality of political power among the people. As James Madison, the
author of the Virginia Plan, boldly asserted, “whatever reason might have
existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one
among sovereign States, it must cease when a national Govern[ment]
should be put into place.”83 In contrast, for proponents of the New Jersey
Plan, the new union was to be very much like the old, consisting of a
confederation of sovereign, coequal states. As such, each state was
entitled to equal representation in the new Congress.

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 242–45. See also RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 63.
1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 37.
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With the divide between the two sides based on deep theoretical
disagreement about the nature of the union and the status of the states in
it, the Constitutional Convention threatened to stalemate. The New
Jersey Plan was rejected overwhelmingly,84 but the delegates’ opposition
to the smaller states’ gambit did not translate into support for the
competing Virginia Plan.85 When delegates from the larger states
attempted to capitalize on the defeat of the New Jersey Plan, it became
apparent that there was substantial support for some alternative
formulation that would protect the smaller states’ political influence in
the new Congress. On June 29, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut proposed
that each state be given an equal vote in the upper house.86 That proposal
was initially defeated on a tie vote,87 but the closeness of the vote itself
demonstrated both the lack of substantial support for the Virginia Plan
and the fact that the delegates increasingly knew the contours of the
ultimate compromise between the larger and smaller states that would be
necessary.
The logjam was broken with the introduction on July 5 of the “Great
Compromise,” drafted by a committee specially charged to find a middle
ground that could appease both the larger and smaller states.88 Also
known as the “Connecticut Plan” because of its similarity to Ellsworth’s
proposal, the proposed compromise would create a bicameral Congress.
The lower house would be elected by the people of the individual states,
with each state receiving the number of representatives based on its
population.89 Meanwhile, as Ellsworth had proposed just a week earlier,
the upper house would maintain the Confederation Congress’s system of
equal political representation of the states. In an effort to mollify the
larger states, the proposal specified that appropriation bills could only

84. Id. at 313.
85. RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 65.
86. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 468, 474.
87. Id. at 509.
88. Id. at 524–25.
89. Id. The representative nature of the lower house, like much of the Constitution, was
compromised by the issue of slavery. As the new national government was understood to have the
power to assess a direct tax upon the property of the various states, Southern states demanded that
slaves be included in the calculation of their representation. Northern states were not prepared to
give the white Southerners political influence based on disenfranchised, enslaved persons. Hence,
the Convention used a compromise first made in the Confederation Congress with respect to a
proposed national tax: slaves would be treated as three-fifths of a person for purposes of calculating
a state’s allocation of representatives in the lower house.
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originate in the lower house. Even with the appropriation provision,90 the
larger states had significant misgivings about the proposal. Nevertheless,
the discussion over the past month and a half had shown that the smaller
states would never agree to the Virginia Plan. On July 16, the delegates
narrowly approved the Great Compromise.91
The change in representation in the upper house profoundly altered
the character of the new Congress. The delegates had previously agreed
that members of the upper house would not be selected by the lower
house, as Randolph had originally proposed, but rather selected by the
state legislatures.92 Coupled with state legislative appointment, the
change in representation ensured that the upper house would provide a
lasting echo of the old Confederation Congress as a forum in which the
states would be represented as equal, corporate bodies. As such, the
Great Compromise wrought a fundamental transformation in the nature
of the new union. The new Constitution did not establish an omnipotent
national government in which the states played no formal role. Nor did it
maintain a federal league in which the states played the central role.
Rather, the new Constitution blended elements of both, with the new
bicameral Congress reflecting the composite nature of the new union. As
James Madison writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers would later
characterize it, the new Constitution was “neither a national nor a federal
Constitution, but a composition of both.”93
The battle over the status of the states and their role in the new
Congress was obviously important in its own right, but it also played a
crucial part in the debates over the new presidency. No feature of the
new government was considered in isolation, divorced from
consideration as to how it would interact with other features. Hence,
changes made by the framers with respect to one element would often
produce “downstream” consequences regarding their approach to other
features of the new government. So too it was with respect to the
relationship between the Senate and the presidency. The smaller states
had won a victory in preserving their political influence in the new

90. Madison, in particular, dismissed the “origination” provision as pointless since the Senate
could simply refuse to pass appropriation bills with which it disagreed. Id. at 527.
91. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 13–14.
92. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 149.
93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Oliver
Ellsworth had similarly defended his proposal to maintain the equal suffrage of the states in the
upper house in these terms, arguing that the new Congress would be “partly national; partly federal.”
1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 468.
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Senate, but their perceived influence profoundly shaped the framers’
deliberations regarding the process for selecting the President.
B. The Presidency
The issue of presidential selection had arisen at the very outset of the
Convention. The Virginia Plan had proposed that the President be
selected by Congress to serve for a single term of seven years.94 Given
the fact of legislative appointment, the limitation to one term was an
important one. In those states in which the governor was selected by the
legislature, the desire to gain reappointment had made the governors
unduly dependent on and subservient to the legislature in the framers’
eyes. The proponents of the Virginia Plan hoped that by rendering the
President ineligible for a second term, he would possess the requisite
independence from Congress.
James Wilson of Pennsylvania opened the debate on the Virginia
Plan by declaring his support for a popularly elected President. Wilson
pointed to the experience in New York and Massachusetts, both of which
had an elected governor, as proof that popular election was “a convenient
and successful” method of selecting the executive.95 Popular election
would also eliminate the President’s dependence on Congress for
election. Strikingly, however, Wilson did not equate popular election
with a direct vote by the people. When asked to transform his remarks
into a formal proposal, Wilson moved that each state be divided into
districts and that the citizens of each district elect a certain number of
electors, who would then meet to elect the President.96 Here, then, was
the first mention of a college of electors, and most notably, it was
introduced to the Convention as a method for implementing, albeit
indirectly, the popular election of the President.
Unfortunately for Wilson, his proposal drew little support. Elbridge
Gerry liked the quintessentially republican spirit of popular election, but
he worried that the people were “too little informed” as to whom to
select as electors and they would therefore be “liable to deceptions.”97
Hugh Williamson, meanwhile, saw no difference between entrusting the

94. The plan as introduced left the number of years of the term of office blank. 1 Farrand,
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 21. Almost immediately, however, the delegates filled in the blank with
a term of seven years. Id. at 64.
95. Id. at 68.
96. Id. at 77, 80.
97. Id. at 80.
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President’s selection to an electoral college and entrusting it to the state
legislatures.98 Wilson’s proposal was overwhelmingly defeated.99 The
Convention then immediately returned to the Virginia Plan’s proposal for
a legislatively appointed President, which the Convention approved by
an equally wide margin.100
This early skirmish over the executive was significant in revealing
the contours of the framers’ initial thoughts regarding the executive, but
its importance should not be overstated. The delegates had rejected the
notion of a President selected by the people, albeit selected indirectly via
an electoral college. Instead, they had settled upon congressional
appointment as the appropriate mode of selection. Yet, they continued to
worry whether the President would be sufficiently independent of
Congress, to whom he would owe his appointment. Moreover, because
the very nature of Congress was itself the subject of intense, ongoing
controversy among the delegates at this point in the Convention’s
debates, this early approval of congressional appointment could be
viewed as only tentative. Until the question of representation in Congress
was settled, the issue of the President’s mode of selection remained open
to reexamination.
The debate over the presidency resumed in full force on July 17, the
day after the passage of the Great Compromise. That debate, which
lasted more than a week, revealed both the delegates’ dissatisfaction with
congressional appointment of the executive and their inability to find a
satisfactory alternative.
Renewing the push for a popularly elected President, Gouverneur
Morris proposed that the President be elected by “citizens of [the]
U.S.”101 Unlike Wilson’s proposal of a month earlier, Morris’s eschewed
the intermediating device of an electoral college and provided that the
people would vote for the President directly. Despite its republican bona
fides, Morris’s proposal drew substantial opposition. Roger Sherman
protested that the people “will never be sufficiently informed of
characters” to select the President and would therefore tend to support
only “some man in their own State.”102 Similarly, George Mason argued
that “[t]he extent of the Country renders it impossible that the people can

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 81.
Id. The vote was eight states against and two in favor.
Id. at 77, 81.
2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 29.
Id.
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have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the
Candidates.”103 Allowing the people to select the President was,
according to Mason, akin to entrusting “a trial of colours to a blind
man.”104
More importantly for present purposes, several framers attacked the
direct popular election of the President as too majoritarian. Charles
Pinckney, for example, suggested that popular election would favor the
more populous states, which could combine to elect a President of their
own choosing.105 Hugh Williamson was even more adamant, declaring
that “[t]he people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State,
and the largest State will be sure to succede [sic].”106 These criticisms
found their mark: Morris’s proposal for the direct popular election of the
President was defeated nine states against to one in favor—a margin of
defeat even worse than that for the indirect popular election proposed a
month earlier by Wilson.107
At the same time, vesting the appointment of the President in
Congress worried many of the delegates, who feared that a legislatively
appointed President would be too dependent upon Congress. “If the
Legislature elect,” Gouverneur Morris declared, “it will be the work of
intrigue, of cabal, and of faction: it will be like the election of a pope by
a conclave of cardinals.”108 Elaborating, Morris warned that “[i]f the
Executive be chosen by the [National] Legislature, he will not be
independent [of] it; and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the
part of the Legislature will be the consequence.”109
These concerns drew added force when the Convention voted to
make the President eligible for reappointment. The Virginia Plan had
made the President ineligible precisely so as to make him independent of
Congress. Proponents of reappointment, however, argued that
ineligibility sapped the executive of the interest and desire to work
diligently on the nation’s behalf. As Gouverneur Morris put it,
ineligibility “tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the
hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment.”110 Congressional

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 24, 32. Only Pennsylvania, James Wilson’s home state, supported the motion.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 33.
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appointment, coupled with the possibility of reappointment, raised the
specter of an executive fully dependent upon the Congress. Echoing
Morris’s fears, Madison warned the Convention:
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl[ative],
Execut[ive], & Judicia[l] powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each
other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why
was it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a
tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual
expositor, as well the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence
of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as
well as the maker of laws; and then according to the observation of
Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed
in a tyrannical manner.111

The delegates found themselves on the horn of a dilemma. They
wished the executive to be selected by some body of knowledgeable,
patriotic individuals who could identify and evaluate worthy candidates;
they wanted the executive to be energetic; and, finally, they wished him
to be independent, capable of resisting congressional encroachments.
None of the options that had been discussed, however, accomplished all
three aims. The first pointed to legislative appointment, but to render the
executive sufficiently independent required that he be limited to one
term, which was thought to sap the office of its energy. Popular election
with the possibility of reelection, on the other hand, would produce an
independent, energetic executive, but the people could not be trusted to
identify the most capable and wise characters, and, equally bad for
delegates from the smaller states who had just fought to preserve their
influence in the new Congress, a direct, nationwide popular election
would favor the larger states over the smaller states.
A possible solution to the dilemma was suggested first by Elbridge
Gerry, who, reprising an idea first advanced by James Wilson a month
earlier, suggested that the President be selected by a college of
electors.112 Gerry preferred the electors to be chosen by the governors of
each state, but there was no support for that option.113 Instead, seizing
111.
112.
113.
President

Id. at 34.
Id. at 57.
Id. Gerry had suggested something very similar in early June, when he proposed that the
be chosen directly by the vote of the state governors, with each governor receiving the
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upon Gerry’s proposal, Oliver Ellsworth suggested that each state receive
between one and three electors depending on its population and that each
state’s electors be chosen by the state legislature thereof.114 Though the
allocation of electors was only weakly linked to each state’s population,
the contours of the body that would become the Electoral College were
becoming clearer. With little debate, Ellsworth’s proposal passed with
substantial support.115
Despite the delegates’ initial embrace of the Electoral College,
dissatisfaction with it appeared almost immediately, prompting them to
reconsider the matter. Several delegates worried that the position of
elector was so insignificant that capable men would not seek the
office.116 As Hugh Williamson tersely put it, the electors “would
certainly not be men of the 1st nor even of the 2[nd] grade in the
States.”117 These opponents then moved that the Electoral College be
replaced—again—by legislative appointment by Congress, which
passed, again, with substantial support.118
The next few days were consumed in a tedious cycle of proposal–
criticism counterproposal–countercriticism that illuminated the
delegates’ increasing frustration with their own inability to find a suitable
formula for selecting the federal executive. James Wilson suggested that,
to minimize the likelihood of intrigue and cabal, the President be selected
by a handful of congressmen determined by lot and sequestered for the
entirety of their deliberations until they selected a President.119 Oliver
Ellsworth suggested that Congress appoint the President to his first term
with reelection contingent on approval by a college of electors selected

number of votes his state received in the Senate. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 175. At the
time, the representation of the Senate was deeply contested, but under the terms of the Virginia Plan
then under discussion, the states’ representation in the Senate would be based on population. Gerry’s
proposal failed unanimously, 10–0, with Delaware’s delegation divided. Id. at 175–76.
114. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 57.
115. There were two separate votes on Ellsworth’s motion. On the question whether the
President be chosen by electors, there were six states in favor, three opposed, and one
(Massachusetts) divided. Id. at 51. On the question whether the electors be chosen by the state
legislatures, there were eight states in favor and two opposed. Id. The next day, the Convention
approved a strict enumeration of electors to which each state was entitled “in the 1st instance,” or the
first election of the President, leaving uncertain what would happen as state populations changed
over time. Id. at 60–64.
116. Id. at 99, 100.
117. Id. at 100.
118. Id. at 101.
119. Id. at 103. Wilson acknowledged that his was not a “digested idea” and was therefore
“liable to strong objections.” Id.
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by the state legislatures.120 Charles Pinckney, in turn, advanced the idea
that Congress select the President but that, rather than being eligible for
immediate reelection, the President would be eligible for reelection at
some later date, subject to the proviso that no President could serve more
than six years in any twelve-year period.121 The increasing complexity of
these proposals, all of which failed,122 demonstrated both the difficulty
of the problem and the delegates’ desire to find some way to resolve the
dilemma. George Mason summarized the views of many when he
conceded that legislative appointment was liable to objections, but “it
was liable to fewer than any other [mode of selection].”123
The delegates’ begrudging consensus in favor of congressional
appointment collapsed entirely during the process of hammering out the
details as to exactly how Congress would perform that task—
specifically, whether the two houses of Congress would vote separately
or by joint ballot. The former would give the smaller states, through their
influence in the Senate, an effective veto over candidates favored by the
larger states; the latter would give the larger states, through their
influence in the House, substantial influence in the selection. As might
be expected, the same divisions that had arisen during the debate over
representation in Congress again manifested themselves. The delegates
from the smaller states viewed the proposal for a joint ballot as a means
to undo the Great Compromise.124 In response, delegates from the larger
states warned of the “[g]reat delay and confusion” that would result if
each House were required to agree on a candidate.125
The proposal to conduct the vote by joint ballot passed, 126 but
dissatisfaction with the proposed system of selection by Congress was
growing with each vote. In this respect, the course of debate was not
symmetrical. A win by one side often created greater doubts about the
entire selection process among the losers than faith in it among the
winners. So it was with the decision to have Congress vote by joint ballot
120. Id. at 108–09. Ellsworth did not explain whether the electors would simply be asked
whether to re-elect the President, the negative answer to which would send the issue back to
Congress, or whether the electors could choose an alternative President.
121. Id. at 111–12.
122. Id. at 111, 115.
123. Id. at 119. At that point, the Convention endorsed the selection of the President by
Congress for a single term, this time for a period of seven years. Id. at 120.
124. Id. at 401 (statement of Mr. Sherman).
125. Id. at 402 (statement of Mr. Ghorum). See also id. (statement of Mr. Wilson) (noting
“danger of delay” if assent of both houses was required).
126. Id. at 403.
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of each house. Even after the Great Compromise, the smaller states
viewed Congress as an institution beholden to the larger states. In the
smaller states’ view, the joint ballot minimized their influence by
submerging it within an institutional structure in which the populationlinked House would dwarf the federal Senate.127 Their concerns
regarding the larger states’ motives were only magnified when,
immediately after the vote on the joint ballot, the larger states defeated a
proposal to have the joint ballot conducted on a state-by-state basis with
each state possessing one vote.128 Yet, the adoption of the joint ballot did
not enamor the larger states either. The primary problem with
congressional appointment had not been that the smaller states would
possess too much influence over the President’s selection (something
that the joint ballot partially redressed), but that congressional
appointment threatened to make the President dependent on Congress
(something left entirely unresolved by the adoption of the joint ballot).129
In short, the adoption of the joint ballot alienated one group of states
without endearing the selection process to the other states.
To resolve the impasse and devise a satisfactory compromise, the
Convention delegates decided to entrust the matter to a committee on
“postponed matters”—also known as the “Committee of Eleven”—in
which each state had a representative.130 Reporting back to the full
Convention, the committee shelved the system of congressional
appointment and instead endorsed selection by an Electoral College.
Specifically, under the committee’s proposal, the President would be
selected by electors appointed by the states in the manner determined by
each state’s legislature.131 To allay smaller states’ fears, each state would
receive the same number of electors as it had representatives and
senators in the Congress.132 The electors would meet in their own states
and vote for two candidates, one of which could not be an inhabitant of
their own state.133 The candidate possessing the highest number of votes
would become President, while the runner-up would become Vice
President. Critically, however, the committee specified that, to become
President, the winning candidate must receive an absolute majority of the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
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Id. at 473, 481.
Id. at 493–94.
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Electoral College; a plurality would not suffice.134 In the event that there
was no majority candidate or a tie between the leading candidates, it
would fall to the Senate to choose the President from among the top five
vote recipients in the Electoral College balloting.135 The President would
serve a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment.136
The committee’s proposal attempted to respond to the criticisms that
had been leveled against the process of legislative appointment that had
emerged in the preceding weeks. To promote the energetic discharge of
his duties, the President was eligible for reelection, but, to guard against
legislative encroachment on his powers, his selection was now to be
made by an independent body of electors, not Congress.137 As to who
would appoint the electors, the only two serious alternatives that had
been discussed were selection by the people or selection by the state
legislatures. Between the two, the former had drawn negligible support;
indeed, Wilson’s original proposal to that effect at the beginning of the
Convention had been overwhelmingly defeated. Hence, the committee
entrusted the selection of electors to the state legislatures. To preserve
the contours of the Great Compromise, each state received the same
number of electors as it had representatives and senators. To avoid cabal
and intrigue among the electors, the electors would not meet together but
separately in their own states,138 and to ensure that the larger states did
not simply appoint their own as President, each elector would vote for
two candidates, one of which could not be an inhabitant of his own state.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the delegates from the smaller
states, an absolute majority of electors was necessary to elect the
President, the absence of which would send the election to the Senate,
where the smaller states had political power equal to that of the larger
states.
Balancing the respective weights of the larger and smaller states was
one of the central problems and tasks confronting the delegates at the
Convention, and the process for selecting the President proposed by the
Committee of Eleven reflected this fundamental divide. Ironically, the
Electoral College was viewed as empowering the larger states at the
expense of the smaller ones precisely because the more populous states

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 493, 494.
Id. at 500–01 (statements of Mr. Morris and Mr. Butler).
Id. at 500 (statement of Mr. Morris).
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would have more electors. To modern eyes, the inclusion of the two
“senatorial” electors gives the smaller states undue political weight. That
is because contemporary commentators use a “one person, one vote”
standard as the appropriate baseline against which to evaluate political
power. The framers, however, were not such pure majoritarians.139
Rather, for the framers, the operative baseline against which to evaluate
the Electoral College was the Confederation Congress, in which each
state received an equal vote. Measured by that baseline, the proposed
Electoral College expanded the political influence of the larger states at
the expense of the smaller states. As James Madison observed, the
inclusion of the Senate would lessen the larger states’ influence
compared to what they would have under a fully population-based
system, but, even so, the larger states would have much more power than
smaller states.140
The smaller states, in return, extracted two important concessions.
The first was the inclusion of the two “senatorial” electors in the
apportionment of electors among the states. Ironically, at the time, that
feature was viewed as largely unimportant. That apportionment of
electors had been implicitly endorsed by the delegates in the wake of the
Great Compromise when they repeatedly approved congressional
appointment of the President, and it had been expressly ratified when the
Convention endorsed the notion that the President would be chosen by a
joint ballot of both houses of Congress, which would have produced a
system that allocated political power to each state in the same proportion
as the proposed Electoral College. In fact, at the time of the debate
regarding the joint ballot, the smaller states viewed the inclusion of the
Senate as part of a joint ballot as insufficiently protective of their
influence in the President’s election. For that reason, no delegate—from
either larger or smaller states—pointed to the inclusion of the two
“senatorial” electors as either sufficient to protect the smaller states’
influence or politically unfair to the citizens of the larger states.141
The second and more important change for the benefit of the smaller
states was the requirement that the President receive a majority of the

139. This is revealed most conspicuously by their treatment of African American slaves, but it
is also shown by the host of suffrage restrictions imposed by the states that limited this franchise,
which restrictions were carried over and applied to the elections for the House of Representatives.
Even the most “democratic” plan offered at the Convention—the Virginia Plan—apportioned
Congress on the basis of the “free” population of each state.
140. Id. at 403 (statement of Mr. Madison).
141. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 17.
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Electoral College. If no candidate received a majority, the election would
go to the Senate. The framers doubted that there would be candidates
who could receive an outright majority of electoral votes. Candidates of
such national renown were likely to be few, and, because the Electoral
College never actually met and balloted only once, there would be no
second or ensuing rounds of deliberations in which a candidate could
muster a majority. Hence, in the expectation of many framers, the
election would regularly fall to the Senate. As George Mason imagined
it, “nineteen times in twenty” the election would fall to the Senate.142 Of
course, entrusting the ultimate election to the Senate favored smaller
states, as each state possessed the same, equal influence in the Senate. To
mollify the larger states, the committee’s proposal therefore limited the
Senate to selecting among the top five vote recipients in the Electoral
College. Thus, as Madison and other framers viewed it, the larger states
would nominate the candidates (through their influence in the Electoral
College), while the smaller states would ultimately select among those
candidates (through their influence in the Senate).143
Only one aspect of the Committee of Eleven’s proposal drew
sustained criticism: the use of the Senate as the fallback forum for
selection. Charles Pinckney and George Mason both pointed out that, by
vesting the power of selection in the Senate, the committee’s plan
courted the very danger it meant to avoid by rendering the President
dependent upon legislative approval, albeit the approval of only one
house rather than both.144 Their concerns, however, were dismissed on
the ground that the Senate could only select from among the top
candidates nominated by the Electoral College.145 The delegates were

142. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 500 (statement of Col. Mason). See also id. at 500
(statement of Mr. Madison), 501 (statement of Mr. Pinckney), 511 (statement of Mr. Rutledge), 524–
25 (statement of Mr. Hamilton). Several delegates envisioned that national development would make
the emergence of national candidates more likely over time, thereby moving the selection from the
Senate to the Electoral College. Id. at 501 (statements of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Wilson).
Nevertheless, to increase the likelihood that the Electoral College would actually elect the President,
Madison proposed to eliminate the majority requirement and instead insert a minimum floor of onethird of the electors as the necessary plurality, but Madison’s motion was defeated handily. Id. at
514. Elbridge Gerry declared that a plurality requirement would effectively give the larger states the
exclusive power to elect the President. Id. (statement of Mr. Gerry).
143. Id. at 500 (statements of Mr. Madison and Mr. Morris), 512–13 (statement of Mr.
Sherman); see also RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 266 (“[T]he prevailing expectation was that the
electoral college would only limit, not eliminate, a legislative role in selecting the president.”).
144. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 511 (statement of Mr. Pinckney), 512 (statement
of Col. Mason).
145. Interestingly, Madison viewed the use of the Senate as somewhat helpful to the larger
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more apprehensive about the Senate’s presumed aristocratic nature.
James Wilson worried that, unlike representatives, senators would be
much more prone to “influence [and] faction” owing to their longer
terms and appointment by the state legislatures.146 Hugh Williamson
fretted that senatorial selection laid the foundation for “corruption [and]
aristocracy.”147 Moreover, the framers’ earlier decisions to vest the
Senate with the power to approve presidential appointments and treaties
gave added force to the concern that, augmented with the power to select
the President, the Senate would be too powerful an entity.148 As James
Wilson warned, “the President will not be the man of the people as he
ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate.”149 The solution, ingeniously
proposed by Roger Sherman,150 was to vest the fallback selection in the
House, but with the proviso that the balloting be conducted on a state-bystate basis with each state receiving one vote. In that way, the selection
would mimic the Senate with its equality of state political power, but it
would be made by the House, whose members enjoyed a more
democratic pedigree. Sherman’s proposal passed overwhelmingly.151 A
little over a week later, the delegates approved the full Constitution.152
Modern observers are amazed by the extent to which the framers
misperceived the forces that would shape presidential elections in the
new republic. In the framers’ views, the presidential electors would be
quasi-platonic guardians possessing great wisdom, exhibiting superior
character, and exercising independent judgment in selecting among the
states, who would then be encouraged to identify candidates who could prevail in the Electoral
College so as to avoid having the smaller states make the ultimate selection in the Senate. Id. at 513
(statement of Mr. Madison). Mason’s motion to remove the proviso that the President be elected by a
majority of the Electoral College was defeated 9–2. Id. at 512–13. At the same time, efforts to
change the number of candidates among which the Senate could choose also failed. Mason’s motion
to restrict the Senate to the top three vote recipients and Spaight’s contrary motion to expand the
number to thirteen (made with the transparent motive to allow each state to nominate a favorite son
for the final balloting in the Senate) were both overwhelmingly defeated. Id. at 514–15. See also
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 27.
146. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 502 (statement of Mr. Wilson).
147. Id. at 512 (statement of Mr. Williamson).
148. Id. at 513 (statement of Mr. Randolph) (arguing that granting power of presidential
appointment to the Senate would “convert that body into a real [and] dangerous [a]ristocracy”); id.
(statement of Mr. Dickinson). Gouverneur Morris worried that, in light of the Senate’s role of
confirming presidential appointments, senatorial selection would make the President too obedient to
the Senate’s will in appointing executive officials. Id. at 522 (statement of Mr. Morris).
149. Id. at 523 (statement of Mr. Wilson).
150. Id. at 527.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 633.
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leading candidates of their day; they would not be servile party Brahmins
committed to the election of their own party’s candidate.153 In the
framers’ view, the election of the President regularly would fall to the
House, in which each state would possess an equal vote in the selection
of the President; the Electoral College with its bias toward the larger
states would not end up being the actual electoral forum. Perhaps most
importantly, in the framers’ view, the primary political division that the
selection process had to mediate was between larger and smaller states
and, to a lesser extent, between slave and free states; the framers could
not (and did not) anticipate that these divisions would be eclipsed by
other distinctions among the states (e.g., coastal v. interior;
predominantly urban v. predominantly rural; agricultural v. industrial v.
commercial) that could not be neatly salved by the inclusion of two
“senatorial” electors for each state or the implicit promise of the election
being conducted in the House of Representatives.154 In fact, even before
those more profound changes in the American socio-political landscape
took place, the rise of national political parties united around a single
presidential candidate subverted and ultimately dashed the framers’
expectations, producing an electoral system substantively unlike (even if
formally obeisant to) that contemplated in Philadelphia in 1787. In a very
real sense, the presidential election for which the framers so earnestly
planned never took place.
Nevertheless, several elements of the framers’ deliberations bear
particular significance for the debate over the NPVC’s constitutionality.
First, and less importantly, the framers expressly and overwhelmingly
rejected vesting the selection of the President directly in the people.
Despite their republican instincts, the delegates believed that the people
would be unable to identify worthy candidates, most of whom (in the
framers’ expectations) would be unknown to the people at large. In a
predominantly rural nation lacking a developed system of public
education and a nationwide system of transportation or communication,
theirs was not a trifling concern. Of course, the rise of national political
parties, along with the establishment of public education and the
development of mass communication among the states, has rendered this

153. But see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (noting that the framers’
expectation regarding electors has been “frustrated”).
154. See RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 268 (“[P]recisely because the electoral college extended
‘the Great Compromise’ over representation, with its dubious expectation that the division between
small and large states would persist beyond 1787, its formal logic proved irrelevant to the actual
politics of presidential election.”).
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particular concern of less moment. Even by the early- to mid- nineteenth
century, the two major political parties had succeeded in making the
presidential campaign a national race in which the parties’ candidates
were well known across the nation. Today, with our system of statefunded public education for all and national media outlets, the suggestion
that the people are too uninformed to vote intelligibly sounds deeply
elitist and anti-republican.
Second, and of more contemporary relevance, the selection of the
President was not to be a raw majoritarian process in which each person
had an equal ability to influence the election of the President. Indeed,
recall that in mid-July, when Gouverneur Morris proposed a nationwide,
direct popular election, Charles Pinckney and Hugh Williamson had
opposed it precisely on the ground that, in their view, it would favor
more populous states.155 As a result, the Convention overwhelmingly
rejected Morris’s proposal. Instead, by the end of the summer, the
framers had settled on a presidential election process that echoed and
preserved the essential contours of the Great Compromise. The Electoral
College would reflect the hybrid nature of the bicameral Congress, with
states receiving the number of electors equal to their joint House and
Senate representation.
Ironically, the framers viewed the new Constitution’s allocation of
electoral weight as favoring the larger states. The smaller states would
receive proportionately more influence than they would under a purely
population-based system, but the larger states would still command
greater power as a practical matter in the Electoral College. The fact that
states received electors based in part on the number of representatives
they had in the population-based House overshadowed the inclusion of
the two “senatorial” electors. Moreover, given the expectation that the
national population would grow and, with it, the size of the House of
Representatives, the influence of the “senatorial” electors in the Electoral
College would likely diminish over time. History, of course, has
confirmed the framers’ expectation in this regard: today, the
“malapportionment” of the Electoral College is much less than it was in
the first presidential election in 1788.
Third, and relatedly, the framers embraced a presidential election
system in which the selection of presidential electors would be made on a
state-by-state basis with each state’s electors accountable to the people of
that state. This last aspect of the process has been overlooked, but it

155. See supra text accompanying notes 103–05.
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bears special relevance for the debate over the constitutionality of the
NPVC. The framers did not specify how the state legislatures would
select their electors—whether, for example, the electors would be
appointed by the legislature or elected by the people of the state—but the
expectation was that those electors would reflect directly or indirectly the
choice of each state’s own electorate. It was for that reason that the
inclusion of “senatorial” electors in the Electoral College mollified the
concerns of the smaller states that the presidential election process would
be too majoritarian. Had the framers thought it permissible for a group of
states to agree to appoint their electors in accordance with some national
popular election, most of the framers would have surely opposed it.
Again, the overwhelming defeat of Gouverneur Morris’s proposal for a
direct, national popular election is instructive. If the framers feared a
direct, popular election as too majoritarian, they surely would have
opposed even more vehemently the notion that a subgroup of populous
states could adopt such a system.
For better or worse, the framers had created a presidential election
system that, like the “Great Compromise” upon which it was based,
combined elements of majoritarianism and federalism. The choice of
President would be made not by an undifferentiated mass of people
nationwide, but by electors accountable to the people of their individual
states. To be sure, the framers did not make these expectations express.
The notion that any state would appoint its electors in accordance with
the wishes, even in part, of voters in other states was beyond the
imagination of any at the time. Nevertheless, if any doubt about this
expectation exists, it is negated by actual experience. As Part III will
show, the actual practice of the states in the wake of the Constitutional
Convention—a practice that has continued to this day—demonstrates the
universal understanding among the states, both then and now, that
presidential electors from each state are to be selected in accordance with
the will of the voters in each state, not the entire national populace.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
As discussed above, the framers assigned the power to determine the
selection of the presidential electors to the state legislatures.156 The
framers, though, did not discuss how the state legislatures would actually

156. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that electors will be selected by each state “in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct”).
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select their electors.157 The states were left to their own devices in
determining what process to use. Nevertheless, the states’ actual use of
this power in the decades following the Constitutional Convention belies
the notion that states have the power to appoint their electors in
accordance with a national popular vote. Not once in our over-twohundred-year history has even one state appointed its electors on this
basis. Rather, in every presidential election, every state has appointed its
electors in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. That
uniform, long-standing practice informs the appropriate understanding of
Article II, and, in so doing, condemns the NPVC.
A. The Early History
The brief time between the ratification of the Constitution in the
summer of 1788 and the first presidential election that winter gave the
states little opportunity to contemplate the proper method for selecting
presidential electors. Even if they had given it much thought, the virtual
certainty that George Washington would become the first President
divested the choice of process of much importance as a practical matter.
Coupled with the absence of any constitutional guidance, Washington’s
immense popularity made the determination of the process for selecting
electors in each state largely meaningless. The result of the presidential
election was a foregone conclusion. Hence, it is little surprise that the ten
states that participated in the first election took widely divergent
approaches to the appointment of their electors.158
Of the ten states, four left the selection of their slate of electors
entirely to the legislature.159 Five of the ten states conducted popular
elections for the presidential electors, but the electoral processes differed
in significant respects. Three of the five states (Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and New Hampshire) provided that their electors would be elected by the
people in a statewide, at-large process, also known as a “general ticket”
system, that allowed each voter to vote for as many electors as that state
was entitled to appoint.160 Virginia provided that its electors would be

157. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 24.
158. New York’s legislature deadlocked regarding how to select its electors, resulting in its
inability to participate in the first election. Meanwhile, North Carolina and Rhode Island had yet to
ratify the Constitution.
159. Act of Nov. 4, 1788, § 4, 1788 S.C. Acts 4. New Jersey vested the selection of its electors
in the upper house of the legislature—the legislative council—and included the governor in the
council’s voting. Act of Nov. 21, 1788, ch. 241, § 8, 1788 N.J. Laws 481.
160. Act of Dec. 22, 1788, ch. 10, § 6, 1788 Md. Laws 317, 319; Act of Oct. 4, 1788, ch. 166,
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elected by the people in districts, with each voter entitled to elect one
elector from his district.161 Meanwhile, Delaware established a unique
system that combined features of an at-large and district contest: each
citizen was allowed to vote for only one elector, who had to reside in his
county, but the top three vote recipients statewide (not the top recipient
from each county) became the state’s electors.162 Finally, Massachusetts
combined legislative and popular appointment in a hybrid process: the
people in each congressional district voted for an elector for that district,
but their vote was advisory. The legislature selected the elector for each
congressional district from the top two vote recipients in that district. In
addition, the Massachusetts legislature appointed the two “senatorial”
electors without any popular consultation.163
In the election of 1792, the experience of the first election and the
passage of time gave the states the opportunity to reassess their selection
systems, though few did so. Of the original ten states that participated in
the first presidential election, eight maintained their existing systems.
Massachusetts dispensed with its complicated hybrid system that
combined popular consultation with legislative appointment and instead
adopted an equally complex system of popular elections that was a cross
between an at-large and district system.164 Meanwhile, moving in the
opposite direction, Delaware substituted legislative appointment for its
complex, popular election system that combined features from the atlarge and districting modes.165 Delaware’s shift to legislative

§ 3, 1788 Pa. Laws 140, 142–43; Act of Nov. 12, 1788, 1788 N.H. Laws 473, 473–74. Maryland
required a degree of geographic diversity. Although each citizen was entitled to vote for up to eight
electors, the Maryland statute provided that five of the eight electors must reside in the “western
shore” and three electors reside in the “eastern shore.” Act of Dec. 22, 1788, ch. 10, § 6, 1788 Md.
Laws 317, 319. New Hampshire, meanwhile, required that each elector receive a majority of the
votes cast, and if that did not work, the legislature would appoint the electors from the leading vote
recipients. Act of Nov. 12, 1788, 1788 N.H. Laws 473, 474–75. The failure of any elector to receive
the required majority left the New Hampshire Legislature with no choice but to select the electors
itself. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892).
161. Act of Nov. 17, 1788, ch. 1, §§ 1–2, 1788 Va. Acts 3, 3.
162. Act of Oct. 28, 1788, §§ 1–3, 1788 Del. Laws 4–6.
163. Act of Nov. 19, 1788, Res. 49, 1788 Mass. Acts 52.
164. Act of June 30, 1792, Res. 80, 1792 Mass. Acts 25. Instead of allocating one elector to
each congressional district, the legislature created four large, special districts, allotting five electors
each to two of the districts and three electors each to the other two districts. Id. Citizens could vote
for as many electors to which their district was entitled. As New Hampshire originally had provided,
if a sufficient number of candidates did not receive a majority of votes, the legislature would appoint
the remaining number of electors. Id.
165. Del. H.R. Journal, Nov. 1792 Sess., at 9–10. New Hampshire also made a more modest
alteration. Under its original law, the legislature appointed electors to fill slots for which there was
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appointment was telling—New York, along with the newly admitted
states of Rhode Island, North Carolina, Vermont, and Kentucky, all
opted for legislative appointment.166 As a result, of the fifteen states
participating in the election, ten states possessing sixty-six electoral
votes—sixty-six percent of the total number of states and fifty percent of
the Electoral College—used legislative appointment.
The 1796 election witnessed a modest shift away from legislative
appointment. Georgia and North Carolina replaced legislative
appointment with popular elections, the former employing an at-large
system, the latter using a district system.167 Somewhat bucking the trend,
Massachusetts returned to its original system from 1789 in which the
people of each congressional district voted for an elector therefrom and
the legislature appointed the two “senatorial” electors.168 Meanwhile,
Tennessee, which had been recently admitted as a state, eschewed both
legislative appointment and popular election, opting instead for a truly
bizarre approach. The legislature divided the state into three districts,
but, professing to want to cause “as little trouble to the citizens as
possible,” it then appointed a group of private individuals in each district
to select the elector for that district.169 The net result of these
developments was that, of the sixteen states participating in the election,
eight states used legislative appointment, three states used a popular, atlarge election system, three used a popular, district election system, and

no candidate receiving a majority of the vote. See supra text accompanying note 160. New
Hampshire eliminated legislative appointment as the fall-back mechanism and provided instead that
there would be a second popular election at which state citizens would choose from among the top
candidates from the first round of balloting. Act of June 20, 1792, 1792 N.H. Laws 398.
166. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 32 (1892) (listing Kentucky among states that used
legislative appointment in 1792 election). Unlike the other states that used legislative appointment,
North Carolina’s legislature subdelegated its appointment power to smaller groups of legislators,
creating four districts of three electors each and empowering the legislators in those districts to
appoint their district’s electors. Act of 1792, ch. 15, N.C. Sess. Laws 8. North Carolina’s system
resembled Massachusetts’s, except that the selection of electors was made by the legislators
representing the specially constituted districts rather than by the people thereof.
167. Act of 1792, ch. 16, N.C. Sess. Laws 9; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 248–49
(reporting Georgia as using popular, at-large election in 1786). Relatedly, Maryland switched from
an at-large to a district-based system. Act of Dec. 24, 1795, ch. 73, 647 Md. Laws 66.
168. Act of June 13, 1796, Res. 20, 1796 Mass. Acts 12–13. Unlike the original statute, the
1796 resolution made the people’s vote binding so long as the winning candidate received a majority
of the vote. New Hampshire likewise returned to its original system in which, though the people
voted in an at-large process for the state’s electors, the legislature appointed electors to fill positions
if there were not a sufficient number of candidates receiving a majority of votes statewide. Act of
June 16, 1796, 1796 N.H. Laws 544, 545–46.
169. Act of Aug. 8, 1796, ch. 4, 1796 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 109, 109–10.
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one state used a hybrid model, with Tennessee’s legislative-appointmentof-the-selectors-of-the-electors system posing an anomalous departure
from the prevalent models of selection.
The election of 1796 was more noteworthy for the role that it played
in the development of perhaps the most important extra-constitutional
force in presidential elections—the establishment of national political
parties. The Federalist John Adams narrowly won election as President
over Republican Thomas Jefferson who, per the then-existing provisions
of the U.S. Constitution, became Vice President. Adams and Jefferson’s
political differences, which had become apparent during the Washington
administration, grew over the course of the Adams administration, which
polarized American politics. Opponents of the Adams administration,
along with former anti-Federalists who had opposed the Constitution,
were drawn to Jefferson and James Madison, becoming the core of the
new Republican (later named Democratic) party. Over the course of the
next four years, both Federalists and Republicans prepared themselves
for a hotly contested, partisan presidential election that they knew to be
coming in 1800.
The emergence of a two-party system had profound ramifications for
the process by which Presidents were elected. Electors would not be
engaging in some deliberative, nonpartisan process of selecting the
person that they thought would be the best President. That romantic view
of electors had always been fanciful, but with the development of
partisan politics, the notion of the Platonic elector was absurd. Electors
would come from one of the two parties and would almost certainly vote
for the candidate from their party regardless of his merits.
More importantly, the development of a two-party structure
influenced the selection of the process used to select the electors.
Precisely because the electors would be committed partisans, it became
necessary for each party to ensure that its committed partisans were
selected. And that, in turn, made the determination of the selection
process deeply partisan. Whether a particular state opted for legislative
appointment or popular election (and, if so, what form) turned less on
abstract political theory and more on an acute, state-specific assessment
as to whether appointment or election would favor one party or the
other.170

170. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 154 (“In anticipation of the election of 1800, there
was scrambling in state after state to revise the mode for choosing electors as one party or both tried
to gain an edge.”).
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B. The Election of 1800
Even with the development of the parties still in their infancy, the
election of 1800 witnessed the first significant effects of political
partisanship on the presidential selection process. Reversing the trend
from the previous election in 1796, four states that had previously used
popular election (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Georgia) opted for legislative appointment.171 Illustrating the emerging
influence of partisanship, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, whose
legislatures were controlled by Federalists, largely did so to ensure that
the entire slate of electors in each state would be pledged to Federalist
Adams.172 Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the Federalist-controlled Senate
prevented the passage of a new election law to authorize a popular
election for the state’s electors, which the Federalists feared would lead
to the politically ascendant Republicans securing the entire slate of
electors. The Federalists then demanded a share of the legislatively
appointed electors.173 Only one state, Rhode Island, moved in the
opposite direction, substituting popular election at-large for legislative
appointment.
Nor were the Federalists alone in using their control of state
legislatures to select the process most advantageous for their party’s
candidate. Virginia, whose legislature the Republicans controlled, shifted
from its district-based system to an at-large system so as to ensure that
Thomas Jefferson, its native son, would win all of the state’s electoral
votes. Pointing to the relative disadvantage to which the district system
exposed the state, Jefferson defended Virginia’s action as driven by the
fact that “while ten States choose either by their legislatures or by a
general ticket, it is folly and worse than folly for the other six not to do
it.”174 Virginia’s move was particularly noteworthy, as it presaged

171. Act of June 14, 1800, 1800 N.H. Laws 563; Act of June 6, 1800, res. 4, 1800 Mass. Acts
13; H.R. Journal, 11, 1st Sess., at 97 (Pa. 1800) (reporting that the two houses of the legislature
would convene jointly that day to appoint electors); H.R. Journal, 1800 Sess., at 26 (Ga. 1801); S.
Journal, 1800 Sess., at 25. (Ga. 1800).
172. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 38.
173. Id. The Pennsylvania legislature deadlocked over the slate of legislatively appointed
electors. This was necessitated by its failure to provide for a popular election because the Federalist
Senate refused to agree to a joint ballot, which the Federalists knew would allow the more numerous
and Republican-dominated House to select the full slate of electors. Only after a compromise was
reached that divided the state’s electors between the two houses was the legislature able to appoint a
slate of electors. Id.
174. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Jan. 12, 1800).
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similar shifts to an at-large or winner-take-all system in other states in
the years ahead.
The net result of these partisan-influenced moves was that, of the
sixteen states participating in the 1800 election, only five states used a
popular election system, two employing an at-large system (Rhode Island
and Virginia) and three employing a district system (Maryland,
Kentucky, and North Carolina).175 In contrast, ten states possessing
eighty-four electoral votes—which represented almost two-thirds of the
total number of states and more than sixty percent of the Electoral
College—used legislative appointment. The election of 1800 marked the
high-water point of legislative appointment—never again would so many
states comprising such a high percentage of the Electoral College use
legislative appointment.176
In addition to demonstrating the influence of partisanship in the
selection of the elector appointment process, the election of 1800 was
noteworthy for several other important reasons. First, it was the first time
the election was thrown to the House of Representatives. The two
Republican candidates, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both received
seventy-three electoral votes—the incumbent President Adams took third
place with sixty-five votes. Because of the tie, the election was thrown to
the lame-duck, Federalist-dominated House of Representatives.177
Through thirty-five separate ballots lasting almost a week, the Federalists
worked to prevent Jefferson’s election.178 Finally, on the thirty-sixth
ballot, the Federalist representative in the Vermont delegation cast a
blank ballot, thereby allowing his Republican colleague to cast the state’s
vote for Jefferson, which in turn gave Thomas Jefferson the necessary
majority to become the third President of the United States.179 While the

175. Tennessee—again—delegated the appointment power to a small group of individuals in
each district as it had in 1796.
176. The election of 1800 was not the high water mark in terms of the absolute number of
legislatively appointed electors. In the election of 1816, there were ninety-six legislatively appointed
electors sent from nine states, but because the Electoral College had since been expanded to 217
electors, the legislatively appointed electors constituted a minority of the College.
177. The Federalists held a 60–46 advantage in the House, but because the House would vote
by state, not per capita, on the presidency, Federalists could not translate their numerical dominance
into a victory for Adams. Federalists controlled eight of the sixteen delegations, one short of the
necessary majority, while the Republicans controlled seven delegations. Vermont’s delegation was
split equally between the two parties.
178. The Federalists generally voted for Burr, thereby producing a state vote for Burr in
delegations in which they had a majority, or, equally as good, splitting the state, thereby depriving
Jefferson from receiving the necessary majority of states. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 40.
179. Id. at 40–41.
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House had finally succeeded in discharging its constitutional
responsibility, the House deliberations did not even closely resemble the
process that the framers had expected. For the framers, the assignment of
the election to the House, voting on a state-by-state basis with each state
possessing one vote, served to protect the smaller states from having a
candidate favored by the larger states foisted upon them. As the debate in
the House in 1800 revealed, however, the principal divide was between
Republican-dominated House congressional delegations, who backed
Jefferson, and Federalist-dominated ones, who, out of spite, backed Burr.
Partisan divisions, not geopolitical ones, shaped the House proceedings.
Second, and relatedly, the election of 1800 prompted the passage of
the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. Under the Constitution as
originally enacted, each elector simultaneously cast two votes.180 The
candidate with the most votes receiving a majority of the number of
electoral votes became President, while the runner-up became Vice
President. This system had already shown one undesirable aspect in
1796, when the losing candidate (Jefferson) became the Vice President in
the administration that he had opposed. The election of 1800, though,
illustrated a different, darker problem with this system of balloting.
Under the Electoral College’s simultaneous voting system, there was no
way for an elector to indicate his preference for President between the
two candidates from his party for whom he was casting his vote. As a
consequence, if each elector cast his two votes for the two candidates
from his party (as partisan electors typically would), a tie among the
winning party’s two candidates would inevitably occur, as in fact
happened in 1800. Worse still, the tie would throw the election into the
House, where the losing party might have control and be able to elect its
candidate (who had lost the election) or, only slightly less bad, choose
the President from among the winning party’s two candidates (which is
effectively what had happened in the 1800 election). With the
development of political parties and partisan electors, the Electoral
College’s simultaneous balloting system was out of step with American
politics.
The ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 addressed these
problems. Each elector would continue to cast two votes, but now the
votes would be cast separately, one specifically for President and one
specifically for Vice President. By allowing for a ticket system, the
Twelfth Amendment thereby eliminated the prospect of a tie between the

180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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two candidates of the winning party. Moreover, it also ensured that the
Vice President would come from the same party as the President—the
fractured, antagonistic administration produced by the 1796 election
would not be repeated. Less importantly, the Twelfth Amendment also
reduced the number of candidates that the House would select among in
case of an Electoral College tie from five to three.
C. The Rise of Winner-Take-All Popular Elections
The development of a two-party system, coupled with the
Republican party’s dominance of American politics in the decades
immediately following the election of 1800, transformed the process by
which states selected their electors. While newly admitted states often
used legislative appointment in their first presidential election, “older”
states that had used legislative appointment gradually began to replace it
with popular elections for the electors.181 In the elections of 1812, 1816,
and 1820, nine different states used legislative appointment, but the
number began to fall dramatically thereafter. The rise of Jacksonian
populism, which venerated popular elections and correspondingly
distrusted appointed officers, put pressure on states to dispense with
legislative appointment. In 1824, only six of the twenty-four states used
legislative appointment, and, in 1828, only two did so.182 By 1836, all
but South Carolina had moved to some form of popular voting for
electors. South Carolina ultimately dispensed with legislative
appointment after the Civil War. The last time a legislature appointed its
electors was in 1876, when Colorado, which had just been admitted as a
state, found itself with too little time to set up a popular election for its
presidential electors.
More importantly, the continuing rise of party politics after 1800
pushed the states to dispense with district-based elections and instead
adopt the at-large, or “winner-take-all” system prevalent today. In 1800,
more states used district-based rather than at-large voting—a
phenomenon that would never be repeated again. In 1804, of the eleven
states that used popular elections, only four (Maryland, Kentucky, North
Carolina, and Tennessee) used a pure district system, while six used at-

181. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 248–49. After 1800, only three states that had
moved to popular elections returned to legislative appointment, and, even then, they did so only for
specific elections: Massachusetts (in 1808 and 1816), New Jersey (in 1812), and North Carolina (in
1812). Id.
182. Id.
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large voting.183 As states dispensed with legislative appointment, they
almost invariably chose at-large elections over district-based
elections.184 By 1824, there were still four states using district elections,
but there were twelve states using at-large elections. Four years later, in
1828, there were only two states using district elections, while there were
eighteen states using at-large elections. By 1832, only Maryland adhered
to its district-based system.185 That meant that, of the twenty-four states
in the union at that time, twenty-two used an at-large popular election
system for choosing the state’s presidential electors.
The triumph of at-large voting did not eliminate district-based
elections entirely. For the same reasons that at-large elections were
favored by the dominant political party in a state, district elections were
favored by the minority party as a way to fragment the state’s electoral
vote and award some electoral votes to their own voters. Hence, after the
1890 election, when Democrats took control of the state legislature in the
then-predominantly Republican state, they immediately replaced
Michigan’s at-large process with a district-process.186 As a result, in the
1892 presidential election, Michigan split its electoral votes, with nine
going to the Republican incumbent, Benjamin Harrison, and five going
to the Democratic candidate, Grover Cleveland. Two years later, when
the Republicans retook the Michigan legislature, they immediately
repealed the districting law and returned the state to an at-large
system.187 Besides illustrating the linkage between partisan politics and
the method of election, the Michigan episode also revealed another
distinctly American feature of presidential elections: the judicial
challenge to election processes. Upset by the Democrats’ actions,
Michigan Republicans challenged the move to district elections as
unconstitutional, resulting in the first U.S. Supreme Court decision
regarding presidential elections, McPherson v. Blacker,188 in which the
Court upheld Michigan’s decision to use district elections as within the

183. Id. at 248. Massachusetts used a hybrid system that combined the district and at-large
process.
184. After 1800, only Massachusetts, which vacillated among the various processes until 1824
when it settled on at-large elections, Tennessee (in 1804), and Illinois (in 1820) adopted districtbased election systems. Id.
185. Id.
186. Act of May 1, 1891, No. 50, 1891 Mich. Pub. Acts 50; see also GEORGE H. KNOLES, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION OF 1892, at 226–27 (1942).
187. Act of Feb. 3, 1893, No. 3, 1893, Mich. Pub. Acts 4.
188. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
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power delegated by Article II to the states. McPherson would come to
play a central role in modern disputes involving the Electoral College.
Today, the Electoral College is comprised of 538 electors,189 and
every state uses popular elections to select that state’s presidential
electors. Moreover, every state but Maine and Nebraska use “winnertake-all” voting, in which all the state’s electors go to the candidate who
received the most votes in the statewide polling. Maine and Nebraska,
meanwhile, use a hybrid system first adopted by Massachusetts in 1804
that combines the district and at-large voting system: one elector is
selected by the people in each congressional district, with the state’s two
“senatorial” electors going to the winner of the statewide vote.190
D. Lessons for Today
There is, of course, a deep irony with respect to the modern election
system that has emerged over time. As a result of the states’ decision to
use popular elections, the modern process more closely resembles the
system that James Wilson first advocated in the early days of the
Constitutional Convention than the process the Convention actually
adopted.191 Wilson’s proposal for a college of electors elected by the
people in districts was defeated overwhelmingly; yet, that is close to the
system that has emerged. To be sure, the rise of party politics has shaped
that system in ways that Wilson could not have foreseen. In particular,
the electors exercise no independent judgment—they are party
functionaries who loyally transmit the electorate’s choice. Indeed, as a
result of the development of the “short” ballot in which only the
presidential candidates are listed, voters typically do not even know the
identities of the electors that they are appointing. Nevertheless, Wilson’s
repeated calls to have the President selected by the people have
ultimately carried the day.
At the same time, however, this history illuminates and informs the
scope of state power under Article II. Throughout the nation’s history,

189. As a result of a federal statute enacted in 1911, the House of Representatives is capped at
435 members, and the Senate currently has 100 members representing the fifty states. Act of Aug. 8,
1911, ch. 5, §§ 1, 2, 37 Stat. 13, 14. By virtue of the Twenty-third Amendment adopted in 1961, the
District of Columbia receives the same number of electors to which it would be entitled if it were a
state but in no event more than that possessed by the smallest state, which is currently three. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXIII, cl. 1.
190. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 802 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1038 (2008). Maine adopted
its system in 1969, which Nebraska copied in 1992.
191. See supra Part II.B.
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states have used one of four processes for selecting their presidential
electors: (1) legislative appointment, (2) popular election in which all
electors are selected on the basis of the statewide vote (an at-large or
winner-take-all system), (3) popular election by district, or (4) a
combination of the latter two electoral systems—a hybrid process in
which some electors are elected on the basis of the statewide vote and
some on the basis of a district vote. Critically, under all four systems,
each state’s electors are selected in accordance with the wishes of the
people of the state, not the nation generally. Not once between 1880 and
today, a period in which every state in the union has conducted a
statewide popular election for its electors, has any state selected its
electors based on the votes of individuals in other states. Rather, as the
framers expected, states have selected their electors based on the will of
state voters, not the nation at large.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT
So what does this history portend for the NPVC? Proponents of the
NPVC seize upon Article II, Section 1’s delegation of power to each
state to appoint its presidential electors “in such manner as the legislature
thereof may direct.” In their view, this grant of authority is without
limitation, authorizing state legislatures to choose any method of
selection that they desire. For support, they point to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, in which the Court stated that
the states possess “plenary power” regarding the manner of selecting
their electors.192 As this subpart demonstrates, the states’ power to
regulate the manner of presidential elections is far more limited than the
proponents of the NPVC contend. In fact, just as the U.S. Supreme Court
has narrowly interpreted the states’ power to regulate congressional
elections to prevent states from destabilizing the constitutional structure,
so too should it deny states the power to undermine the stability of the
presidential election process.
A. Delegated Versus Retained Power
That the states generally have the power to choose the manner in
which their electors are selected begins the constitutional analysis; it
does not end it. The states possess their electoral appointment power not
by virtue of their preexisting sovereignty—as the federal presidency did

192. 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892).
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not exist prior to the Constitution, the states could not have possessed
any such power with respect to it—but by delegation from the
Constitution.193 Hence, in assessing the scope of that power, the question
is not whether there is any constitutionally imposed limit on state
authority (as is the issue when the states use an authority derived from
their pre-existing sovereignty), but rather whether the Constitution
empowers the states to undertake the type of action under review.194
And, in that vein, it is important to remember that the scope of a state’s
constitutionally delegated power does not include the power to
reconfigure or undermine the federal constitutional structure.
The Court’s decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton is
instructive in this regard.195 In the 1990s, several states imposed term
limits on their members of Congress. Defenders of these laws pointed to
seemingly categorical language of the Elections Clause of Article I,
Section 4, which delegates power to the state legislatures to control the
“Times, Places and Manner” of holding elections for Congress.196 Much
like the NPVC’s proponents, term limit supporters argued that the
categorical language of the Elections Clause provided state legislatures
with plenary power to adopt any elections regulation not expressly
forbidden by the Constitution, and, since no provision in the Constitution
forbade term limits, they contended that state-imposed term limits were
therefore constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.
In the Supreme Court’s view, the adoption of term limits was
tantamount to imposing another qualification for federal office above and
beyond the three qualifications identified in the Qualification Clauses of
Article I.197 Hence, for the Court, the critical issue was whether the
Elections Clause authorized states to impose additional qualifications for
federal office.198 In answering that question in the negative, the Court

193. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000); cf. U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (concluding that state power to regulate
congressional elections is delegated by Constitution rather than reserved power of state).
194. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 805.
195. See id. at 779.
196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
197. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 814–15; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”).
198. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832–33.
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identified three, mutually reinforcing considerations. First, and most
importantly, the Court traced the historical understanding of Article I,
both in the Constitutional Convention and thereafter.199 For the Court,
the absence of any suggestion at the Constitutional Convention or
ratification debates that the states could use their power over
congressional elections to establish additional qualifications for office in
general, or term limits in particular, was telling.
Second, the Court looked to the history of congressional elections.
At several points in American history, Congress had chosen to seat
representatives or senators despite state laws that purported to render the
person ineligible for office. Although these instances were limited in
number, the Court found significant Congress’s declaration in these cases
that the states lacked the power to set additional qualifications.200 With
respect to term limits in particular, the Court found it probative that, both
in the wake of the Constitutional Convention and thereafter, no state had
sought to impose term limits for federal office.201
Third, the Court looked to democratic theory and constitutional
structure. For the Court, the imposition of term limits undermined the
power of the people to choose their own representatives by denying them
the right to reelect a long-serving representative or senator.202 Moreover,
in the Court’s view, the constitutional structure belied the notion that
individual states could impose term limits for members of Congress even
from their own states. The right to select U.S. representatives and
senators, the Court ruled, belonged not to the individual states but to the
people of the United States.203 What the Court meant by this aphorism is
not entirely clear, but the Court seemed to be suggesting that each
person, no matter in what state they lived, had an interest in ensuring that
the qualifications for Congress remained uniform throughout the nation
and that no state be allowed to impose additional qualifications for
service in Congress. In essence, to allow Arkansas to impose term limits
on its U.S. representatives and senators harmed not only the citizens of
Arkansas who might support their reelection but also the citizens of other
states, who likewise have an interest in how Arkansas structures its
elections for its congressional representatives.

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Id. at 826.
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Although Thornton involved state power under Article I’s Election
Clause, the Court’s analysis in that case sheds light on the analogous
question whether Article II authorizes the states to appoint their
presidential electors based on the outcome of a national popular election
rather than state elections. At the outset, it is important to note the
similarity in the constitutional provisions at issue. Article I’s Elections
Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each
State by the Legislature thereof.” Article II, Section 1, meanwhile,
provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.” In both cases, the
state legislatures are authorized to regulate the “[m]anner” of election,
and, in both cases, that power is delegated in seemingly unlimited terms.
B. The Limited Scope of the States’ Delegated Power over Presidential
Elections
The same sources of law to which the Court turned in Thornton to
conclude that the Elections Clause of Article I does not empower states
to adopt term limits for Congress likewise point to the conclusion that
Article II does not empower states to select presidential electors based on
the outcome of the national popular vote. Let’s begin with the history of
the adoption of Article II. As noted above, at the Constitutional
Convention, the framers expressly repudiated a nationwide popular
election for the President.204 When Gouverneur Morris proposed just
such a presidential election process, it was overwhelmingly defeated.
Opponents worried not only that the people would not be sufficiently
informed about candidates across the nation, but also that the process
would be too majoritarian—that such a process would disadvantage
voters in smaller states, who would be ignored in a purely majoritarian
election system. Indeed, the desire to protect the interest of small states
(and their citizens) explains not only the rejection of a direct, nationwide
popular election for President but also the Convention’s subsequent
decision to replicate the contours of the Great Compromise in allocating
electors among the states: states would receive the number of electors as
they possessed both representatives and senators in Congress.
In fact, the framers created a presidential election process that was
manifestly nonmajoritarian. Recall that the framers created a contingent

204. Supra Part III.A.
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election procedure for elections in which no candidate receives a
majority of the Electoral College. In the views of the framers, the
presidential election would ordinarily be decided by the House of
Representatives because few candidates would ever gain the required
Electoral College majority.205 Indeed, the framers spent so much time
crafting the contingent election process precisely because they thought it
would be resorted to on a regular basis. Moreover—and this is a crucial
point—the framers agreed that, when the presidential election fell to the
House of Representatives under this process, each state’s delegation
would act in a corporate capacity as a unit and cast one, equal vote on
behalf of the state. Recall that the framers had originally decided to
repose the contingent election procedure in the Senate, where each state
receives an equal vote, but they feared the perceived aristocratic bias of
the Senate. Allocating the contingent election procedure to the House but
mandating that each state’s House delegation vote as a unit and cast one,
equal vote replicated the Senate’s voting structure but without the
aristocratic gloss. In essence, the framers not only expressly rejected a
national popular election for President; they instead created an election
process in which the crucial votes would be cast by individuals who
almost assuredly would vote in accordance with the wishes of the voters
in their state, not the undifferentiated nation at large.206 Moreover,
popular sentiments would be aggregated in a manner that ignored
population differences among the states.
Against this backdrop, it is simply inconceivable that the framers
thought that they were empowering the states to appoint their electors in
accordance with popular sentiment outside the state, let alone a national
poll. Having rejected Gouverneur Morris’ proposal for a direct
nationwide popular election and having spent weeks crafting a
complicated process in which states, as corporate bodies, would play an
important role, the framers could not have imagined that those decisions
could be undone by states, either acting alone or in concert, deciding to
appoint their electors in accordance with the national vote. To be sure,
the framers did not envision that every state would use a statewide poll to
select its electors (thereby creating a facsimile of a nationwide election),
and therefore they could not imagine that some states might choose to
205. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45.
206. Recall that the U.S. Constitution does not require U.S. Representatives to be elected by
district. That requirement was first imposed in 1842 by Congress by statute. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c
(2012). In the first few years following ratification of the Constitution, many states elected their
Representatives at large.
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appoint their electors in accordance with the nationwide vote.
Nevertheless, given the framers’ rejection of a direct popular election
and their rejection of election processes that were insufficiently
protective of small state prerogatives (such as election by Congress by
joint ballot), their reaction to the NPVC can be safely inferred.
Likewise, as in Thornton, the actual practice by states in the wake of
the adoption of the Constitution informs the scope of state authority
under Article II. In the first few presidential elections, some state
legislatures appointed the electors themselves, while others provided for
their selection through a popular election.207 Of those states that used
popular elections, some used an at-large process that mimicked a winnertake-all system; other states used a district system, while others used a
hybrid combination of the two.208 Notably, under all of these systems,
the presidential electors were selected in accordance with the sentiments
of the voters in the state (or a district within it). Every state ultimately
moved to a system of popular election, and most states embraced a
winner-take-all system so as to maximize their electoral clout.209 No
state, however, has ever appointed its electors in accordance with the
national popular vote, even though since 1880 every state has conducted
a state poll, thereby providing the opportunity for states to do so if they
wished.
Finally, considerations of democratic theory and constitutional
structure point against reading Article II to permit states to appoint their
electors on the basis of the national vote. At the outset, it is important to
note that the NPVC does not promote democracy. Since 1880, every
President has been selected via a process that is democratic. Because
voters in every state vote for President and because those votes are
transmitted faithfully into electoral votes—the winning electors almost
invariably cast their ballots for the candidate to whom they were
pledged—the current, state-by-state system is undeniably democratic.
Rather, the charge leveled by critics of the Electoral College is that it is
not sufficiently majoritarian—that the manner in which popular votes
are aggregated into electoral votes may produce a President who received
fewer popular votes than another candidate.210 As I have written
elsewhere, the current system is largely majoritarian in structure and

207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra text accompanying note 40.
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effect.211 In only four presidential contests in the nation’s history has the
winning candidate received fewer popular votes than the candidate
elected President, and in all but one of those elections, the losing
candidate failed to win a majority of the popular vote, undermining the
suggestion (based on a claim of political majoritarianism at least) that the
wrong candidate won.
More importantly, though, majoritarianism is not synonymous with
democracy. One can believe—as the framers very much did—in
democracy but not majoritarianism, at least not in the strict sense urged
by the NPVC’s supporters. Indeed, the Constitution creates a federal
political structure that contains several nonmajoritarian elements, such as
the Senate, the bicamerality and presentment requirements for federal
legislation, and, most obviously, judicial review. Indeed, no less an
authority than James Madison expressly described the governmental
structure created by the Constitution—including, most notably, the
presidential election process—as a “mixed” system that blended, in his
words, “national” and “federal” characteristics.212
To be sure, the NPVC differs from term limits for federal officers in
that the latter prevented voters from reelecting a long-serving
representative or senator, while the NPVC does not formally preclude
any voter from voting for the presidential candidate of their choice. In
that respect, the NPVC is not anti-democratic, at least as a formal
matter.213
The NPVC, however, does resemble the state-imposed term limits
invalidated in Thornton in another manner: like state-imposed term
limits, the NPVC alters a federal election process in which the voters in
every state have an interest and does so in a manner that disregards the
sentiment of voters who wish to keep the current system. It should go
without saying that every U.S. citizen has an interest in the presidential
election process. Unlike representatives or senators, the President is the
one federal official who represents the entire nation. Indeed, if
Oregonians have an interest in how the voters of Arkansas elect the
representatives and senators from that state—as the Court in Thornton
seemed to suggest—it follows a fortiori that they likewise have an
interest in how Arkansas, California, or any state selects its presidential
211. Williams, supra note 9, at 195–203.
212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
213. As I have written elsewhere, nonconsenting states may respond to the NPVC in
nondemocratic ways, such that one might view the NPVC as encouraging such nondemocratic
actions. See Williams, supra note 9, at 209–15.
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electors. The significance of that interest should not be overstated—an
Oregonian, for example, surely cannot complain about ordinary election
regulations, such as ballot access laws, adopted in other states—but
neither should it be ignored entirely. As Thornton seems to suggest (or at
least a best reading of this portion of the Thornton ruling), our
constitutional structure presumes that states may not use their
constitutionally delegated powers over the election of federal officials in
a manner that fundamentally interferes with the constitutional structure.
Both in structure and effect, the NPVC threatens the interest of
voters in other states. The NPVC is a state-initiated interstate compact
that will go into effect once a sufficient number of states comprising at
least 270 electoral votes sign on to it. Once it does so, it does not matter
whether voters in nonsignatory states desire to preserve the current stateby-state electoral system; the national popular vote will be conclusive.
Whether or not Congress could by statute require states to appoint their
electors in accordance with the national popular vote,214 the notion that a
group of states can, by their concerted action, transform the manner in
which the President is elected cannot be right. If a group of states can
agree to pledge their presidential electors on the basis of the national
vote, then they must likewise be able to agree to pledge their electors to a
candidate only from those states, only from one political party, or only in
accordance with the wishes of a designated committee of “presidential
experts.” In short, any interstate compact regarding the manner in which
presidential electors are selected threatens to exclude the wishes of voters
in nonsignatory states, and, therefore, it seems inconceivable that a
Constitution that specifies how the President is to be elected and that lays
out a process for amending its requirements would permit a group of
states to alter so fundamental a part of our constitutional structure.
C. But What About McPherson v. Blacker?
Finally, McPherson v. Blacker does not contradict the foregoing
analysis and suggest that state power over the manner in which
presidential electors are selected is unlimited.215 There, the Court upheld

214. Compare, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–14 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(arguing that, under Article II, state legislature’s choices regarding appointment process must be
respected), with Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming Presidential Elections by
Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote Compact, and
Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 238–39 (2011) (suggesting that Congress has the power to
regulate the presidential election process).
215. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
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the Michigan legislature’s decision to switch from an at-large to a
district-based popular election system for its presidential electors.216 To
be sure, the Court used some expansive language, such as its untempered
declaration that the Constitution “leaves it to the legislature exclusively
to define the method [of selecting the electors].”217 That language,
however, must be read in the context of the case. The Court was
adjudicating the constitutionality of an appointment system that had been
used by numerous states over time, including several in the first
presidential election in 1789. Indeed, after the Court construed the text of
Article II as giving the states “plenary authority,” it then conducted an
extensive analysis of the Constitutional Convention and early, postConvention history regarding the various modes of appointment used by
the states.218 In particular, the Court gave substantial weight to the
framers’ expectation, voiced by Madison, that most states would adopt
the district system.219 Moreover, the Court repeatedly emphasized that
numerous states had used a district system in the first few presidential
elections.220 This “contemporaneous practical exposition of the
Constitution” was, in the words of the Court, “too strong and obstinate”
to call into question the validity of the district system for electing
presidential electors.221
Far from supporting the constitutionality of the NPVC, then,
McPherson actually calls it into question. First, McPherson’s extensive
review of the Constitutional Convention debates and the electoral
practices of the states in the wake of the adoption of the Constitution
confirms the analytical approach endorsed here. As suggested above, the
framers’ expectation regarding the method of appointment likely to be
adopted by the states and the “contemporaneous practical exposition of
the Constitution” necessarily informs the proper interpretation of state
power under Article II. Second, McPherson validated a practice that both
the framers expected to be used and that states had in fact used in the
wake of the Constitution’s adoption. Neither can be said on behalf of the
NPVC. No Framer—not even James Wilson, the most vocal proponent

216. Id.
217. Id. at 27.
218. Id. at 27–35.
219. Id. at 29.
220. Id. at 29–33; see also id. at 36 (noting this “long continued” practice).
221. Id. at 27; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 816–19 (1994)
(noting that congressional practice in early years of the Republic yields important insight into
constitutional meaning).
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of the direct election of the President—ever suggested that, under the
system adopted by the Convention, the states could appoint their electors
in accordance with a nationwide vote.222 Moreover, at no point in the
history of the United States, let alone in the first few presidential
elections, has a state appointed its electors in accordance with the
popular vote outside the state.
In sum, Article II gives states broad discretion to choose the manner
of appointing their electors, but not every conceivable method of
appointment falls within the scope of that discretion. States may choose
to conduct popular elections, but the states’ appointment of electors must
be based on the results of each state’s poll, not aggregated with those
from other states. By attempting to provide for the direct popular election
of the President, the NPVC attempts to reverse the framers’ decision to
eschew such manner of election, and it therefore exceeds the power
delegated by the Constitution to the states.
V. CONCLUSION
The NPVC seeks to effect a fundamental change in the presidential
election process. But like other state-initiated attempts to circumvent the
federal constitutional framework for federal elections, the NPVC does so
in a way that exceeds the states’ constitutionally delegated authority. As
the Court admonished in Thornton, change, if it is to be undertaken,
“must come not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an
individual State, but rather—as have other important changes in the
electoral process—through the amendment procedures set forth in Article
V.”223

222. Cf. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 812–13 (noting absence of suggestion by framers of existence
of state power to be constitutionally significant).
223. Id. at 837. To be sure, that process is difficult in practice, but it is not impossible. In fact,
many of the most recent constitutional amendments adopted by the states involve the Presidency.
The Twentieth Amendment moved the inauguration to January 20 and addressed what happens when
the President-elect dies before taking office; the Twenty-second Amendment limits the President to
two terms; the Twenty-third Amendment gives the District of Columbia membership in the Electoral
College; the Twenty-fourth Amendment bans poll taxes in federal elections, including presidential
elections; and the Twenty-fifth Amendment addresses presidential incapacity and succession.
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